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ABSTRACT 
 
Taming the Waters that Taketh from the Devil’s Playground:  
A History of Flood Control in  
Clark County, Nevada,  
1955-2010 
 
by 
 
Jarvis Marlow 
 
Dr. Eugene Moehring, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of History 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
The Las Vegas valley is the driest metropolis in the United States, with an annual 
rainfall of less than five inches. A large majority of the annual precipitation occurs 
between May and September in the form of high intensity thunderstorms. Since the 
founding of Las Vegas in 1905 until the formation of the Clark County Regional Flood 
Control District in 1986, the five jurisdictions that make up the Las Vegas valley: Las 
Vegas, North Las Vegas, Henderson, Boulder City, and Clark County, struggled to 
manage stormwater. The principal defect was that they reflected the particular whims of 
each government entity, largely ignoring the nagging geologic characteristics that made 
the valley so susceptible to flooding. Often, dikes and flood channels built in one city 
were not integrated with those in the adjoining city. After devastating floods in 1983 and 
1984 exploited the gaps in the “patch-work” flood control system, a group of progressive 
minded politicians, engineers, and citizens aggressively campaigned for the formation of 
a regional flood control district. In 1986 Clark County residents approved a one-quarter 
of one-percent sales tax increase for the funding for the flood control district. Over the 
past quarter-century, the Clark County Regional Flood Control District funded a network 
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of detention basins and flood channels throughout Clark County, which helped manage 
the massive physical expansion of the Las Vegas valley in the 1990s and early 2000s.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Noah didn’t fool around when God gave him news that it was going to rain, he had 
better build an ark. Unfortunately, Clark County gets no warning when it’s going to 
flood.”1 
 
 
Figure 1. July 3, 1975 Caesars Palace Flood  
(image courtesy of CCRFCD)  
 
 
                                                 
1 Laura Wigard, reporter, Las Vegas Review Journal. August 24, 1986. 
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February 9, 2009 was a cold damp Monday morning in Las Vegas. So when Gale 
Frazier heard from his public relations manager Betty Hollister that not one local media 
outlet called for his opinion nor was one complaint received from a private resident, he 
was ecstatic. Frazier, the General Manager of the Clark County Regional Flood Control 
District (CCRFCD), expected a full morning covering calls about the previous weekend’s 
heavy rainfall. During his twenty-one years working on flood control in Clark County, it 
was the first time no one had questioned the effectiveness of the county’s flood control 
plan.  
 The CCRFCD is twenty years into completing the flood control master plan, with 
another thirty-years required to build out the current system of detention basins and 
channels. But already Las Vegas is experiencing far fewer flood problems than in 
previous decades. In fact, 2003 was the last deadly flood event not contained by the 
regional flood control system -- “a success,” Frazier noted in a 2009 interview, “that all 
Southern Nevadans should celebrate.” This is a far cry from the early 1990s when 
residents mocked the District’s master plan for being, “just a day late and dollar short.” 
As far back as 1959, when the first regional flood control measures were proposed for 
Clark County, residents continued to suffer because of the mismanagement of funds, lack 
of cooperation between the towns in the county and lax building code enforcement.2 
 It can be difficult for new residents to see flood control’s benefits, given that the 
last major storm to cripple the region came in 2003. The region experienced a massive 
thunderstorm in August 2007 that produced the same intense runoff as the 2003 storm, 
                                                 
2 Gale Frazier, Clark County Regional Flood Control District - General Manager, interview by author, tape 
recorded, Las Vegas, NV., February 13, 2009. Quoting Marian Timmerman, Las Vegas resident whose in 
1990 friend was swept into a flood channel at the intersection of Topaz Street and Russell Road. “Flood 
projects chase decades of neglect Projects OK’d along washes.” Las Vegas Review Journal, August 11, 
1991. 1A 
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but was subsequently contained by the region’s flood control system. In addition, Las 
Vegas is the driest metropolitan area in the nation, with the lowest annual precipitation 
rate of four inches. Not surprisingly, over Las Vegas’ one-hundred-year history there 
have been residents, developers and even city planners who actually scoffed at the notion 
that it could flood in Southern Nevada.  
 This thesis traces the history of flooding in the Las Vegas valley and the vital role 
comprehensive regional flood control planning has played since the creation of the 
CCRFCD in 1986. More specifically, this work looks at the District’s management, 
construction, and community involvement since 1987 and what is planned for the coming 
decades to protect current and future residents. It will also explore the ramifications of 
CCRFCD’s fiscal and managerial success, which made it one of the preeminent land-use 
agencies in the West and one that prompted other cities like Denver, Phoenix, Riverside, 
and Albuquerque to adopt many of the District’s best practices. At the federal level, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) itself has been relying increasingly on 
the modeling and engineering from Clark County to support its own flood plain mapping. 
FEMA currently borrows or recruits CCRFCD and local flood control staff to assist other 
communities, especially in the South, to adopt regional building standards and 
stormwater conveyance systems to manage 100-year flood events, while preparing the 
citizens for the possibility of 200 and 500-year flooding events. This paper’s final section 
will discuss the expanding role of CCRFCD to support the various environmental and 
sustainability agencies in Southern Nevada.3 
                                                 
3 The term “100-year flood (event) will be defined further in the piece; however, it is important for the 
reader to understand the phrase is a statistical benchmark for a given region’s probability of receiving a 
major flooding event in a given year. Peter Jackson, Senior Engineering Associate, City of Las Vegas 
Flood Control. Interview by author, March 25, 2009. 
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 Successful flood control is not measured by stopping stormwater from entering an 
urban community; it comes from managing the water flow once it enters the network. 
Whether it is rivers and streams, pipes and culverts, or channels and detention basins – 
management of rain water in urban networks can be complicated by developers and city 
planners adopting standards without answering two vital questions: why does it flood, 
and were does it flood? For eighty-years, prior to the formation of the CCRFCD, Las 
Vegas developers and planners largely failed to address these questions.  
 Records of flooding in Southern Nevada date back to the late 1800s, with the first 
official accounts coming shortly after the city’s birth in 1905. But it was not until a series 
of deadly floods in the mid-1950s that local officials and urban planners began to realize 
that earlier flood control measures, which relied on lessons learned from river flooding in 
the East, failed to protect property and lives, as Las Vegas began to leapfrog washes that 
once lay beyond the city limits. As the town grew into a vibrant metropolis with a dense 
commercial corridor and radial residential growth patterns, the community developed 
separate work-life environments that straddled natural flood plains. The creation of the 
CCRFCD in 1986 facilitated the rapid physical expansion of the community’s network in 
the 1990s up through present day by controlling and isolating flood waters in a regional 
system of detention basins and conveyance channels, allowing for growth to occur in 
expansive floodplains once designated as uninhabitable. Thanks to funds generated from 
one-quarter of one percent of the sales tax collected in Clark County since 1987 the 
CCRFCD manages flooding hazards through land-use controls, floodplain management, 
and revising the system’s construction “Master Plan” every five years, which allows for 
refocusing efforts per current development needs. 
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This thesis traces the evolution of the community’s flood control practices 
following the massive 1955 flood, first, with the passing of the Nevada Revised Statute 
543 (NRS 543) in 1959 which established flood control policies at the state level. This 
law mandated that Nevada cooperate with the federal government to prevent loss of life 
and property, disruption of commerce, interruption of transportation and communication 
and waste of water resulting from floods. In that same year the United States Army Corps 
of Engineer released its Report on Survey for Flood Control: Las Vegas Wash and 
Tributaries, which depicted a community paralyzed by a reliance on federal funding. In 
1962 local leaders proposed funding the Corps’ master flood plan, but voters rejected that 
bond issue, resulting in three decades of reactive flood control measures. This work will 
show that the failure to adopt the Corps’ plan in the early 1960s allowed the CCRFCD in 
1987 to implement a different and more effective plan that promoted the compact and 
uniform physical expansion of the Las Vegas metropolitan area during the late 1980s, 
1990s, and early 2000s. Emphasis will be placed on the small group of politicians, 
planners, private citizens, and businessmen who brought the community together in 1986 
to approve a sustainable funding mechanism for regional flood control. Finally, the work 
will explore the success of the District’s fiscal policies, mission for the future, and its 
cooperative efforts with FEMA, Southern Nevada Water Authority, and other 
environmental agencies to protect people, property, and most importantly, the region’s 
water supply.4   
 
                                                 
4 Gale Frazier, Clark County Regional Flood Control District - General Manager, interview by author, tape 
recorded, Las Vegas, NV., February 13, 2009. “Flood Hazard Analyses – Las Vegas Wash and Tributaries: 
Special Report – History of Flooding, Clark County, Nevada 1905-1975,” provided by CCRFDC 
(document available on CCRFDC website), 1. NRS 543.020 Declaration of Policy found on the world wide 
web at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/NRS-543.html.  
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The Las Vegas Valley 
 In the past four decades the Las Vegas valley has experienced hyper-growth in its 
population, economy, and physical layout. From 1986 to 2006 Las Vegas consistently 
ranked as the fastest-growing metropolitan area in the United States. In the late 1990s, 
Henderson and North Las Vegas were among the top five fastest growing cities in the 
nation. Estimated to now host over 2 million inhabitants, Clark County’s population 
doubled every decade after Las Vegas’s founding in 1905. Embodying western expansion 
through urban-suburban sprawl, the Las Vegas metro area consists of the cities of Las 
Vegas, Henderson, North Las Vegas, Boulder City, and unincorporated county lands that 
include the world famous Las Vegas Strip and its suburbs. The metro area covers 600 
square miles of the Mojave Desert and claims nearly every open piece of land from the 
Spring Mountains in the west, to the Sheep Mountain range in the north, Lake Mead to 
the east, and the growing area heading southward along Interstate 15 toward the 
California state-line. Most of this land hosts single family neighborhoods and small to 
medium commercial complexes. 
 Unfortunately for urban planners, Las Vegas is the most geographically isolated 
metropolis in the continental United States, unlike earlier growth patterns seen in Los 
Angeles, Seattle, and San Francisco that resembled spokes on a wheel. With outer 
communities connected by transportation and freight lines, Las Vegas developers 
designed an urban network that grew by layers. Infrastructure costs tied to drilling 
through the desert’s hard caliche soil virtually prohibited the development of large home 
tracts miles beyond the existing network that were typical of other western metropolitan 
areas. Even today, prime real estate in the valley sits on the ever expanding edge of the 
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urban network. Consequently, the region’s growth pattern since the 1950s has primarily 
remained radial.5 
 
 
Figure 2. Color representation of population growth in Las Vegas valley 
 (Courtesy of Clark County Regional Flood Control District) 
 
 
 With no local commercial hubs, the community has fanned out from the central 
resort corridor into suburbs (fig 2). As land in the core began selling for higher prices in 
                                                 
5 Kay Bandley, 50 year Las Vegas resident and residential home builder from the 1950s through the 1990s. 
Interviewed by author, transcript, Las Vegas NV., April 12, 2009. Gale Frazier, Clark County Regional 
Flood Control District - General Manager, interview by author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, NV., February 
13, 2009. 
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the 1950s and 1960s, commercial and residential developers expanded outward to the 
virgin desert – a process that has continued until this present day. Early development off 
Fremont Street in downtown Las Vegas headed eastward along Charleston Boulevard to 
Sunrise Mountain, and along the Boulder Highway as well as westward up to and beyond 
Decatur Boulevard and later Summerlin master planned community. Thanks to the Strip’s 
growing influence, residential and commercial growth east of the great resorts traveled 
southward along Maryland Parkway, Eastern Avenue, and other thoroughfares until the 
late 1980s when the development of Green Valley finally linked Las Vegas and 
Henderson population clusters. By the 1990s the valley’s southern rim experienced 
massive expansion with Summerlin in the west and Anthem and Seven Hills in the east, 
Southern Highlands, Mountains Edge, Rhodes Ranch, in the south. More recently, North 
Las Vegas has enjoyed growth along the northern beltway, which connects the 
communities of Centennial in the northwest and the master planned community at Aliante 
in the far north, to Interstate 15 and U.S. 95. 
The Land  
 Flood hazards in the arid Southwest are created when the land is altered by 
surface paving, homes, and developers changing the land’s natural elevation. If the land 
has been desert for thousands of years, and suddenly driveways and streets are introduced 
where rain waters once flowed, the water will find new places to travel, not respecting 
property or jurisdiction boundaries. Less than an inch of rain on the desert floor can be 
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deadly if it comes in the form of a high-intensity, isolated thunderstorms, which are 
commonly called micro-bursts or micro-cells.6 
 The topography of the Las Vegas metropolitan area is such that it is situated in a 
natural depression, which is commonly referred to as “a bowl turned on its side.” When 
stormwater, irrigation, commercial water run-off, and the nature stream systems enter the 
valley it becomes part of the region’s watershed. Clark County has ten watersheds, the 
Las Vegas valley watershed covers the greatest area.7 This thesis will primarily focus on 
the Las Vegas valley watershed (fig 3), which ranges in elevation from 12,000 feet at the 
peak of Mt. Charleston to 1,500 feet above sea-level at Lake Mead. To the west, the 
valley is bordered by the Spring Mountains, which are 3,000 to 12,000 feet tall, and to the 
north by the Ground Gunnery Range, whose peaks rise above 7,000 feet. The Black 
Mountains comprise the valley’s southern rim while Sunrise Mountain serves as the 
eastern boarder.  
The Las Vegas valley watershed area is approximately 1,520 square miles; its 
washes and stormwater channels drain through the urban core into the Las Vegas Wash 
southeast of metro area. All the washes are fed by urban runoff, shallow groundwater, 
reclaimed water and stormwater. The Las Vegas Wash, which is classified as an urban 
river, includes a wetlands area that historically has been the “kidneys” of the local 
environment -- cleansing the water that flows through it, filtering out harmful residues 
from fertilizers, oils, and other contaminants. The Las Vegas Wash is twelve miles long 
                                                 
6 “Cooperation Urged to Curb Drainage Woes” Las Vegas Review Journal, October 14, 1986. Gale Frazier, 
Clark County Regional Flood Control District - General Manager, interview by author, tape recorded, Las 
Vegas, NV., February 13, 2009. 
7 Lake Mead, Grand Wash, Lower Virgin, Muddy, Meadow Valley Wash, Las Vegas Wash, Havasu-
Mohave Lakes, Piute Wash, Sand Spring-Tikaboo Valleys, Ivanpah-Pahrump Valleys. 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/surf/county.cfm?fips_code=32003 
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and empties into Lake Mead. In the metro area there are eight major washes that feed into 
the Las Vegas Wash; Central, Lower Wash, Duck Creek, North Basin, Range Wash, 
Gowan, Pittman Wash, and the two largest, the Flamingo and Tropicana Wash (fig 4).8   
 
 
Figure 3. Out line (white) of the Las Vegas Valley Watershed. 9 
                                                 
8 Las Vegas Wash Coordination Committee http://www.lvwash.org/html/what_chrono.html 
9 Retrieved from the world wide web http://ufdp.dri.edu/projects/lvwash.htm 
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Peter Jackson, of the City of Las Vegas Flood Control Department described alluvial 
material as “decomposed mountains.” Over thousands of years, the deposits on the 
canyon’s outflow creates a scattered mass resembling a hand-fan. Because there is little 
or no vegetation on arid mountains to prevent erosion, when the stormwater or snow melt 
flows down the steep slopes, large amounts of debris are transferred through canyons and 
deposited on the outflow point at the mountain’s pass (fig 5). The fan is composed of 
soul, rocks, small vegetation and boulders -- the debris causes the majority of the damage 
during floods in the arid Southwest.11 
 
Figure 5. Illustrates the debris deposit that forms the alluvial fan.12 
 
                                                 
11 Peter Jackson, Senior Engineering Associate; City of Las Vegas Flood Control, interview by author, tape 
recording, Las Vegas, NV., March 25, 2009. 
12 Image retrieved from the world wide web 
http://lang.sbsun.com/projects/fireflood/graphics/alluvialfan.gif 
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 As the alluvial fan extends out from the mountain’s base, floods combined with 
the decomposed material, act like a natural plow cutting out numerous washes in the 
loosely compacted soil. Without the constant presence of water, the washes deteriorate by 
erosion, become overgrown with vegetation, or destroyed by man-made development. All 
these factors lessen the probability of future watersheds traveling thru the same wash. 
The random flow patterns are very hazardous for communities that develop near an 
alluvial fan. Virginia Valentine, the first CCRFCD General Manager and a former Clark 
County Manager, noted in a 2010 interview that the problem with alluvial fans is there 
are no channels: “It’s like pouring a glass of water on a table top, it goes every where.” 
As the Las Vegas metropolitan area expanded in the early 1950s, more developers built 
homes on the edge of alluvial fans, which unavoidably disturbed the natural washes and 
exposed countless properties to major flood hazards. It was not until the mid-1960s that 
local officials and engineers began studying the region’s hydrology, which involved the 
interaction of water with natural and manmade landscapes.  
 Urban-hydrology is defined as the study of a region’s hydrological processes   
affected by urbanization. Ever since humans have congregated together in towns and 
cities they have attempted to change their immediate surroundings. Stormwater drainage 
has always been a challenge for urban developers who are continually seeking a rapid and 
efficient means to eliminate standing water from the built-up area. Achieving this 
objective obviously depends primarily upon knowledge of the characteristics of heavy 
rainfalls within a specific region. In 1956, Soil Conservation Service magazine published 
a study of urban flooding. The article reported that since the 1930s, urbanizations had 
increased the frequency of flooding by replacing the natural cover with smooth 
14 
 
impervious surfaces. Following the more widespread use of digital computers in the 
1960s, scientists were able to compile relationships between rainfall and stormwater 
runoff in a city’s network of streets and developed land.  
Prior to the 1960s Las Vegas engineers, builders, and officials did not consider 
the natural flow of stormwater that channeled run-offs southeastward toward Lake Mead. 
With large stretches of desert between neighborhoods, engineers in the 1940s and 1950s 
designed the early flood control measures to protect homes from the rainfall that fell 
within a neighborhood’s boundaries. Contractors built channels and pipes to convey 
upstream stormwater away from their homes, with no regard for the down-stream 
properties. Little thought was given to connecting flood control structures across the 
growing metro network, which instead became a patch-work system of channels, ditches, 
and drainage pipes. Each jurisdiction in Clark County had its own priorities and did not 
coordinate with one another to address regional flood hazards – a state of affairs that 
continued until the formation of the CCRFCD in 1986.13 
The Flood Waters 
 Thunderstorms in the Southwest occur during periods of hot weather between 
May and September. Heavy rains fall on steep mountains, which in Las Vegas are located 
west of town in the Spring Mountains and in the Sheep Mountains north of the metro 
area. Rainwater then rapidly runs off the hard desert soils, which one expert calls “the 
desert varnish,” through a system of smaller natural channels and washes, collecting in 
one of the eight regional washes, and then concentrating in urbanized areas at lower 
elevations. The lack of agriculture, along with caliche clay under the surface soil, inhibits 
                                                 
13 M.J. Hall. Urban Hydrology, (New York: Elsevier Applied Science Publishers 1984), 6, 20, 39, 111. 
Adam Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American 
Environmentalism  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 191. 
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water absorption. Over time, flood waters move large amounts of debris out of the 
mountains and along the valley’s floor forming large “dry river beds.” During massive 
storms these soil deposits and boulders are forced through the washes, potentially causing 
more damage to property than floods near river systems, which are called riverine floods.   
 Both riverine and alluvial fan flooding occur in Nevada. The former begins when 
a river rises and discharges large volumes through low-lying lands. Typically the river 
rises over a period of hours or days before flooding adjacent lands. Commonly 
experienced in the Midwestern states, flood waters overrun river banks or breach levees. 
In Nevada, riverine flooding has occurred in the south along the Virgin River and in the 
north along the Truckee River. Downtown Reno and the low-lying areas near the river 
often experience riverine flooding during heavy rains and spring snow melt runoff. The 
Truckee, a normally quiet stream that meanders gently through Reno and Washoe County 
has had a history of periodic rampages since 1861. Significant floods over the past half-
century have occurred in 1950, 1955, 1963, 1983, 1997, and 2005 – resulting in millions 
of dollars in damage to downtown and to communities along the river. Flood waters rise 
in the wake of early snow pack melting during unseasonably high heat fronts or intense 
winter rain storms. Unlike flash floods that surprise Southern Nevadans, residents and 
officials along the Truckee River have significant time to sandbag and evacuate low-lying 
areas as the river rises.14 
 Waters levels through the Truckee River system are normally around six-feet 
deep. In 1950 and then again in 1955, the river crested at twenty-six feet. Truckee floods 
created so much damage over the past half-century that area governments worked 
                                                 
14 Reno Evening Gazette, December 23, 1955. Senator Richard Bryan, interview by author, tape recorded, 
Las Vegas, NV., March 10, 2010. 
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together with California and federal officials to build upstream dams. Even with a 
number of reservoirs west of Reno built to handle upriver flooding including Stampede, 
Boca and Prosser, nothing stopped the deluge making its way down hill in 1997 and 
2005. Every building in downtown Reno within three hundred yards north of the river 
and one-hundred yards south of the river had been flooded at least once during this six 
year period. The New Year’s Flood of 1997 created such devastation in the eastern part 
of the valley, entire businesses were lost and Harrah’s Hotel and Casino as well as nearly 
every casino along the river had to be closed until the waters receded. One of the major 
reasons for downtown flooding is the bridge spanning the river from Booth Street and 
East Second Street was built with aesthetics in mind, any large trees coming down the 
river in a flood would get lodged and the river would pool behind the bridge as more and 
more debris clogged the area.15 
 The alluvial fan flooding that affects Southern Nevada occurs when 
thunderstorms drop large amounts of water in the mountains and higher elevations. The 
flow quickly exits the canyons at a high velocity across the desert floor, collecting in the 
Las Vegas Wash and then dumping into Lake Mead. Flash floods are more common in 
the Southwest and have caused millions of dollars in property damage throughout the Las 
Vegas metro area. Thunderstorms in Southern Nevada are not unique compared to the 
rest of the arid Southwest; they usually occur in summer and are typically short lived and 
very intense. Nonetheless, local flood control officials jokingly refer to thunderstorms in 
this region as “popcorn” -- exploding with no warning. For example, on August 19, 2003, 
three-inches of rain fell in ninety minutes northwest of downtown Las Vegas. Water 
                                                 
15 “Along a River’s Edge” VisitReno.com, April 2005, found on the world wide web at 
www.renolocals.com/evanoff/april-05.php 
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meters in the affected area measured 3,000 cubic feet of water per second flowing down 
Gowan Road. One cubic foot of water is 7.5-gallons or approximately the size of a 
basketball in a box; there are roughly 3,000 cubic feet of water in a residential swimming 
pool. The storm’s rapid release of rain in a forty-square mile area displaced air around the 
rain-burst, knocking over trees along the outer edge of the storm’s ring. Less than fifeteen 
miles away at the National Weather Service’s McCarran International Airport rain gauges 
reported no precipitation.16 
 Since the major washes are dry most of the year in Southern Nevada and major 
events such as the August 2003 storm do not occur each summer season, flood control 
officials worry that newer residents are unaware of the flood potential beyond the 
established system. The natural element of floods aside, Gale Frazier, the CCRFCD’s 
general manager, believes the influx of people over the past fifty years from “wetter 
climates” has played a major role in the human cost associated with floods. In a 2009 
interview Frazier speculated that newer residents come from parts of the nation that 
experience riverine flooding and underestimate the potential of flooding because they live 
miles from the Colorado River and Lake Mead. In addition, Frazier believes that people 
accustomed to riverine flooding react casually to flash floods as if they heard a radio alert 
or viewed a television warning of a specific area that might experience rising water. But 
unlike other America regions where rainfall is more frequent, storms in the Southwest hit 
                                                 
16 Nevada Division of Water Planning – Flood Management in Nevada, 
http://water.nv.gov/WaterPlanning/wat‐plan/PDFs/pt3‐4a.pdf 1. Gale Frazier, Clark County Regional 
Flood Control District - General Manager, interview by author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, NV., February 
13, 2009. The flood control system in Las Vegas can handle flow rates around 13000 cubic feet per second.  
Apples to Oranges: Comparing Storms in 2003 to 2007. Video supplement, 2007-2008 CCRFCD annual 
report. . “Flood-control facilities worked well, officials say: [Final Edition].” Las Vegas Review Journal, 
September 12, 2003,  http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed April 8, 2009). 
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very fast; they can also be extremely intense and it is virtually impossible to forecast 
where the rain will fall. 17 
 
 
Figure 6. CCRFCD public service advertisement 
 
 
The public relations department at the CCRFCD produces community outreach 
programs on the City of Las Vegas and Clark County public access television stations in 
a format entitled “The Flood Channel.” This program is used to warn the public that most 
storm damage and death occur beyond the storm event area and that standing water is 
potentially deadly (fig 6). Betty Hollister, public relations manager for the CCRFCD, 
notes that most emergency rescues during flood events typically happen with blue sky, 
sunshine, and almost always down-stream from the storm event. During the August 2003 
                                                 
17 Gale Frazier, Clark County Regional Flood Control District – General Manager, interview by author, 
tape recorded, Las Vegas, NV., February 13, 2009 
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flood, for instance, Juliette Lopez who stopped at the traffic light at Rainbow Boulevard 
and Gowan Road, recalled water flowing near her tires’ rims. Lopez had to crawl onto 
her roof and be rescued by a helicopter because by the time the light turned green the 
water was up to the car’s windows.18 
 
 
Figure 7. Juliette Lopez near the intersection of Rainbow and Gowan, August 19, 2003  
(Photo credit given to John Locher, Las Vegas Review Journal) 
 
 
Classifying Floods and the Types of Mitigation 
 
 Hydrologists measure the size of a flood in terms of recurrence intervals. 
Mistakenly called “100-year floods,” storms are measured independently of one another - 
based on the statistical probability of rainfall and water flow in a specific region, not on 
the number of years between floods. For example, a 100-year flood has a one-percent 
chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year. The National Oceanic and 
                                                 
18 Betty Hollister, Clark County Regional Flood Control District - Public Relations Manager, interview by 
author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, NV., February 13, 2009. 
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Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) collects rain gauge data; in Clark County the 
gauges are at McCarran International Airport. NOAA submits that information to the 
National Weather Service to calculate the statistical flood probability of a 100-year event. 
In Las Vegas, forty years of data have been collected. According to the National Weather 
Service, the area’s 100-year standard is 2.77 inches of rain within a six-hour period. 
Local engineers and flood control officials have classified eleven major events dating 
back to 1960 as 100-year floods. Each event has caused more than a million dollars in 
property damage. Prior to the CCRFCD, Frazier notes, many residents believed the 
community was safe for 10, 15, 50 and even 100 years after a major storm event occurred 
because weathermen and the media mistakenly claimed the probability of future floods. 
To ensure increased levels of flood protection for residents, businesses and tourists from 
the hazards of flooding in Clark County, the CCRFCD’s master construction plan since 
1987 has designed all flood control facilities to handle Southern Nevada’s statistical 100-
year flood.19 
 
                                                 
19 US Geological Survey website, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/FS-229-96/ . CCRFCD “Public Information” 
website, http://acequia.ccrfcd.org/pdf_arch1/Public%20Information/Flood%20Definitions%20-
%20December%202009.pdf . “Flood control measures avert worse damage.” Las Vegas Review Journal, 
July 11, 1999, 1A. Gale Frazier, interviewed by author, tape recording , Las Vegas, NV., February 13, 
2009. 
21 
 
 
Figure 8. Lower Las Vegas Wash Detention Basin  
(image courtesy of CCRFCD) 
 
The structures that are used in Southern Nevada are common across the 
Southwest: detention basins, earthen levees, and concrete-lined channels to control the 
flow of water through an urban corridor. In 1985, engineers from James M. Montgomery 
Consulting in Salt Lake City began looking at ways to manage the valley’s stormwater 
flowing off an alluvial fan. They discovered that levees three or four feet in height 
constructed along the edge of the fan corralled the water to a central point near the apex 
of the fan. By building a detention basin at the apex to capture the water the levee system 
blocked, the random flow patterns coming off the fan are illuminated. The basins also 
served to capture massive amounts of potentially dangerous debris. Unlike dams, the 
engineers design the system’s basins to release the flood water as it reaches an outflow 
point at the downstream end of the basin. Without basins to capture the violent waters 
originating in the higher elevations and slowing down the flow rates (fig 10), channels 
would have to be deeper and wider, like the Los Angles River. However, the Los Angles 
River, which was a natural flowing waterway through the city, was built in the bed of an 
22 
 
actual river (fig 9). The channels that snake through the metro area of the Las Vegas 
valley have to be much smaller to fit into existing flood control structures or installed 
under road-ways. Most importantly the community can not afford to have channels 
occupying scarce and very valuable land in the valley’s urban core (fig 11).20  
 
Figure 9. The Los Angeles River 
 
                                                 
20 Friends of the Los Anglees River, found on the world wide web at http://folar.org/?page_id=16. Gale 
Frazier, general manager of CCRFCD, interviewed by author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, NV., February 13, 
2009. 
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Figure 10. Ann Road Detention Basin, northeast of Las Vegas.  
(image courtesy of CCRFCD) 
 
 
Figure 11. Workers building an underground storm drain in Northwest Las Vegas. 
 (image courtesy of CCRFCD) 
24 
 
Many proponents of stormwater harvesting argue that Clark County is losing an 
opportunity to use the flood waters collected in the basins for irrigating public lands. 
Friends of the Desert Wetlands Parks, a local group formed by Norma Cox in the mid-
1990s, claims that stormwater flowing through the system of basins and concrete 
channels enters the Las Vegas Wash with no filtering system to separate non-point 
pollutants such as motor oil, fertilizer, and commercial chemicals. The wash’s natural 
ecosystem is unable to properly clean the stormwater during heavy or sustained rain 
storms. Nonetheless, the basins are designed to take the fast-flowing flood waters and 
disperse their violent energy over its large floor. As the water’s velocity is drastically 
reduced by pooling on the basin’s floor, it slowly rises toward the outflow point, spilling 
into a system of conveyance channels that safely transport the water through the urban 
core toward Lake Mead.21  
The CCRFCD relies on accurate rainfall and stream gauge data. Presently, the 
district manages 170 real time gauges in Clark County that cover 8,000 square miles of 
mountains, desert, dry river beds and Lake Mead shoreline. Prior to 1989, the region only 
had 3 gauges at McCarran International Airport. Las Vegas did not start collecting rain 
gauge data until the Army Corps of Engineers presented its findings in the wake of the 
June 1955 flood. When the hydrologists and engineers attempted to design the regional 
system in the late 1980s they had little historical data, which forced them to fill in the 
gaps of missing data with assumptions and rainfall modeling from other arid regions. 
Once the CCRFCD began connecting the region’s existing structures in the early 1990s, 
these earlier assumptions were proven wrong, causing some of the first flood control 
                                                 
21 Norma Cox, concerned Las Vegas resident and member of the League of Women Voters, interviewed by 
author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, NV., June 1, 2010. 
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measures to fail during heavy rains. For nearly a decade after the district was formed the 
various public works departments had to play catch-up in order to correct all the poorly 
designed flood control systems.22 
In 1995 FEMA issued Clark County one flood plain map, which allowed all local 
jurisdictions to work under one set of data points for the area. Prior to 2002, with the 
advent of the computer-based Geographic Information Systems (GIS), flood data was 
kept on paper maps. Even with one flood plan map engineers pieced together hydrologic 
studies conducted over hundreds of square miles, which did not take into account specific 
topographic features or soil conditions, which affect the hydrology of a region. In 
addition, the maps were designed based on different levels of technology over the 
decades. After 2002, GIS gave flood control engineers across the nation a repository of 
digitally formatted flood maps that could be pieced together to create detailed regional 
maps or very specific maps at the neighborhood level. As a result, present-day flood 
control engineers can calculate the flow of water once it hits a watershed, allowing them 
to better predict the probability of flooding.  
By 2002, the CCRFCD had done such an excellent job in advancing Clark 
County’s flood control system that FEMA awarded the region the nation’s first digital 
map modernization program (DFIRM), which coincides with the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP). By being the first community to work with the DFIRM 
system, CCRFCD had the best tools for predicting flood hazards and advising residents in 
newly identified flood zones that flood insurance would be required. On the other hand, 
more land and existing homes could be removed from flood zones as a result of the high-
                                                 
22 Virginia Valentine, former CCRFCD General Manager, interview by author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, 
NV, February 24, 2010. Tim Sutko, CCRFCD Senior Hydrologist and Environmental Mitigation Manger, 
interview by author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, NV, March 18, 2010. 
26 
 
powered computer programs that accurately predict flooding hazards. In less than twenty-
five years, with a comprehensive regional flood control plan, Clark County has become 
one of the nation’s premier communities in the battle to mitigate flood hazards. However, 
this is a far cry from the first eighty years of Las Vegas history. The community 
experienced decades of piecemeal flood control measures, jurisdictions not cooperating, 
poor oversight of building codes, and near criminal construction practices. The first 
efforts to regionalize flood control came in the wake of the June 13, 1955, flood, but the 
story of flooding in Southern Nevada goes back to the founding of Las Vegas in 1905. 23 
The First 50 years of Las Vegas 
 In 1974, the Nevada Division of Water Resources and several city and county 
entities in Clark County requested that a flood hazard analysis study be prepared covering 
Las Vegas Wash and tributaries in the Las Vegas valley. In 1975, under the direction of 
the United States Department of Agriculture, the Soil Conservation Service began a study 
of the region’s flood history. It based its research upon an assembly of newspaper 
accounts starting shortly after Las Vegas’s founding in 1905 - routine climatological 
accounts were omitted, and only those articles describing some type of flooding or 
resource damage were reviewed and assembled.24  
The 1977 report became the de facto resource for flood control officials in the 
early 1980s, because there was no data kept on flood events until 1960. The report also 
assisted flood control officials in establishing a list of flood-prone areas. Plaintiffs and 
                                                 
23 Kevin Eubanks, Assistant General Manager CCRFCD, interview by author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, 
NV., March 5, 2010. FEMA website http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/fhm/mm_why.shtm 
24 Flood Hazard Analyses: Las Vegas Wash and Tributaries, Clark County, Nevada. Special Report, 
History of Flooding, Clark County, Nevada, 1905-1975, (Reno, Nevada  : United States Department of 
Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, 1977), 1. CCRFCD estimates 11 floods since 1960, found on the 
world wide web http://www.ccrfcd.org/03-history.htm. 
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defense lawyers routinely used the report in the late 1980s and early 1990s to determine 
liability on the part of developers and public works departments or to prove that flood 
hazards existed in a specific area of the valley prior to the city’s formation. Most 
importantly, it revealed that the Las Vegas area had consistently experienced flooding 
since 1905; indeed, prior to the great flood of 1955 the valley had been hit by seventy-
eight floods. Most of the stormwater flowed through the outlying desert, periodically 
washing out a road or a small section of railroad track. Research has revealed that in 1906 
and 1910 Meadow Valley, northeast of Clark County near Pioche, experienced the two 
largest floods to ever hit Southern Nevada.25  
In late March 1906, a large section of desert in Southern Utah near St. George 
down through the Virgin River Gorge and into present day Mesquite, Nevada, was hit by 
the heaviest rains seen in the region. The Salt Lake Tribune received reports from railroad 
engineers, farmers, and local residents that nearly all the low lands were laid waste by 
torrents of rain-water and snow melt. The water destroyed crops, killed live stock, 
knocked out telegraph service between Salt Lake City and Los Angeles for days, and 
damaged or destroyed over one-hundred miles of railroad track from Acoma to Moapa. 
The lack of adequate drainage pipes along tracks in the Meadow Valley forced massive 
amounts of flood waters along the raised railroad grade. Reports from early survey teams 
noted trees, boulders and debris damaged all the bridges in the valley. Union Pacific 
officials estimated the repairs would take over a month to complete, forcing the railroad 
                                                 
25 Flood Hazard Analyses: Las Vegas Wash and Tributaries, Clark County, Nevada. Special Report, 
History of Flooding, Clark County, Nevada, 1905-1975, (Reno, Nevada  : United States Department of 
Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, 1977), 2. 
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traffic through Las Vegas to be diverted north to Goldfield and then across the southern 
Sierra Nevada Mountains and down through the Imperial Valley.26  
Unlike later floods in the Meadow Valley and Virgin River, in1906 the population 
in the Las Vegas valley was less than one-thousand residents. It can be speculated that the 
damage to the railroads negatively impacted the local economy, but during the early years 
of the town, the economy was still in its infancy. The city was so small it could not 
accommodate the passengers from the north bound trains out of Los Angeles, forcing 
many trains to immediately turn back after pulling into the Las Vegas station to replenish 
their boiler’s water tanks. The Union Pacific hired 350 men from the valley to assist 
nearly a thousand others dispatched from Salt Lake City. The economic impact of the 
reconstruction work was offset by the severing of a vital supply line that brought in the 
mail, fresh produce, and most importantly Utah cattle. It took repairs crews until late 
April 1906 to repair the track.27  
Then on January 3, 1910, the largest flood in Southern Nevada history rushed 
through the Meadow Valley and down the Virgin River, inundating the communities of 
Moapa, Bunkerville and the farm lands situated near present-day Mesquite. One-hundred 
miles of Union Pacific railroad track was destroyed between Caliente in southern Lincoln 
County, Nevada, to just outside of Moapa. Reports out of Calinete painted a picture of 
massive devastation – deposits of mud and silt one-foot deep in nearly every house in the 
area. The water and debris flowing out of the high grounds destroyed many farms. With a 
                                                 
26 Salt Lake City Tribune, March 26, 1906. Las Vegas Age, March 31, 1906. 
27 Las Vegas Age, March 31, 1906 and April 7, 1906. 
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drainage basin as large as the state of Pennsylvania, the narrow Meadow Valley was 
unable to carry the relentless floods in the usual channels.28  
Robert Graham, editor for the Caliente Prospector, had to secure a local quarter-
horse to escape the torrent of rushing water. After many attempts to cross the bloated 
Virgin River his horse was swept away in the swirling waters; he escaped with his life, 
but had to strike out on foot for nearly sixteen miles to Panaca. During his trek through 
the Meadow Valley, he recalled places along the flood’s path where two-feet of water 
stood over the tracks for miles, one spot he observed four-feet of ice over the tracks that 
had frozen during the frigid high-desert nights. Farther down the valley a train of thirty 
rail-cars was completely overrun by the rampaging waters; the crew narrowly escaped to 
high ground. For two days they hiked through the hills until they finally reached the small 
community of Guelph nearly fifty miles away.29 
It took repair crews from Salt Lake City, Las Vegas, and Los Angeles over three 
weeks to repair or replace thousands of railroad ties and track on the main line. Residents 
were displaced for months. From the time the Meadow Valley line opened in 1905 floods 
washed out the tracks three separate times. The 1910 flood forced the Union Pacific to 
either rebuild or invest millions in relocating the track to higher ground. In the end, 
company officials decided to invest millions of dollars to cut out portions of the adjacent 
mountains to raise the tracks out of the Meadow Valley.  
The 1910 flood knocked out railroad service between Salt Lake and Las Vegas, 
diverting the entire railroad traffic bound for Southern California through Goldfield. Even 
though the Union Pacific reassured local government officials that the rebuilding efforts 
                                                 
28 Las Vegas Age, January 8, 1910 and January 15, 1910 
29 Las Vegas Age, January 8, 1910. Ibid, “Rushing Torrents” 
30 
 
for the southern portion of the damaged tracks would be staged in Las Vegas, the town’s 
business class became convinced that floods had to be controlled.  Business in Las Vegas 
grew in the days after the flood, as men and capital flowed into the small community. 
There had been a local depression of sorts affecting Las Vegas since the town’s founding 
in 1905, but the railroad made Las Vegas the headquarters for the work on the south side 
of the 100-mile gap, with all the material staged and the workers housed in the 
community. The company pumped thousands of dollars into the local economy every 
week.30 
Prior to the June 13, 1955, flood, the 1923 storm over downtown caused the worst 
damage to the city. Unlike the 1955 event, the damage in 1923 was caused by high 
winds, lightening and poorly constructed buildings. During the city’s first fifty years, the 
flooding continued to washout railroad tracks, damage communities on the Virgin River 
and wash out sections of road on the valley’s periphery that were built to accommodate 
the urban expansion. Most flooding in the valley was isolated, affecting only a few homes 
or a small section of road, and typically lasted only a short period of time. For example, 
the 1938 flood in the southeast part of the valley during intense rainstorms between 
February 22 and March 3, virtually cut off Boulder City and Las Vegas. The stormwater 
washed out large sections of road and railroad track across the desert. But repairs were 
made quickly and little attention was given to the damage in local newspapers. Most of 
the water that rushed through the valley during the 1930s and 1940s spared the larger 
metropolitan area. For the most part, until the early 1950s downtown Las Vegas and its 
suburbs between Charleston Boulevard to the south and Washington Avenue to the north 
were protected from massive stormwaters rushing out of the surrounding mountains 
                                                 
30 Las Vegas Age, January 22, 1910 
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because they were situated on high ground and the waters were corralled by the natural 
washes. In addition, the outlying washes had not been affected by the sporadic 
developments west of downtown and the Union Pacific Railroad tracks. Lastly, roads in 
urban core, especially those along the eastern section of the town near the Huntridge 
community, were able to withstand the stormwater run-off from storms that occurred 
over the city. But the 1955 flood forced Las Vegans to face the consequences of 
developing lands in flood-prone areas and assess the benefit of growth and the hazards of 
flooding.31 
 
 
Figure 12. Boulder Highway, March 3, 1938, flood.  
Courtesy of UNLV Special Collections 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Las Vegas Evening Review Journal, March 3, 1938.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
1955-1962 
 
“Homes are built in areas that were historic waterways for previous flashfloods. 
In the old days no desert-wise prospector or cattle-raiser would dream of camping in a 
dry-wash, especially with the prospect of a flash-flood.”32 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Youth diving from a street lamp into the Charleston Boulevard Underpass. 
(photo credit to Bill Rogers) 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 “A Futile Warning” Las Vegas Sun, June 16, 1955. 
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The Flood of 1955 
A tidal wave of water from the Spring Mountains west swept down on Las Vegas 
during the afternoon hours of June 13, 1955. Towering storm cells over Red Rock 
Canyon and Mt. Charleston produced an inch of rain in less than 45 minutes. The force of 
the flood waters created 10-feet deep gulleys on the outskirts of town and knocked out 
power to many areas of the community; 70 percent of the residents did not have 
telephone service throughout the night and next day.33 The emergency within the city 
required that all auxiliary police and off-duty officers be called up for 24-hour service. 
Patrolmen abandoned squad cars to direct traffic, stacking fruit crates and boxes to get 
above the rushing water. Mercy Ambulance that day managed to get a single ambulance 
across the Union Pacific tracks to the west side of the city. Patients in all emergency calls 
on that side of the tracks were taken to Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital, while calls 
on the east side went to Las Vegas Hospital. The floods divided Las Vegas in half at the 
railroad tracks because the Charleston and Bonanza underpasses flooded. Built in the 
1940s to serve the expanding suburbs southwest of downtown, the Charleston Boulevard 
and Bonanza Road underpasses were the city’s primary east-west passageways. Shortly 
after the flood waters began rushing through town on June 13, both underpasses filled to 
the bottom of the train trestles. 34 
 
                                                 
33 Clark County’s population in 1955 was estimated at 80,000 people. 
34 Las Vegas Sun, June 14, 1955. Las Vegas Review Journal, June 14, 1955. 
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Figure 14. Corner of Main Street and Charleston Boulevard, June 13, 1955. 
(image courtesy of UNLV Special Collections) 
 
 
Figure 15. Corner of Fremont Street and Charleston Boulevard, June 13, 1955. 
(image courtesy of UNLV Special Collections) 
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Figure 16. Rescue crews in a boat at the Charleston underpass, June 13, 1955.  
(image courtesy of UNLV Special Collections) 
 
 
Figure 17. A fire-engine crew pumping water out of the Bonanza underpass, date 
unknown. (image courtesy of UNLV Special Collections) 
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 Roads resembled rivers and the high water stranded cars. A common sight across 
Las Vegas and North Las Vegas during the evening commute on June 13 was motorists 
abandoning their cars and striking out on foot. Even though people tried to drive or walk, 
many residents were virtually isolated as water backed into yards and homes. Newer 
sections of the city suffered complete isolation. For example, residents of the Twin Lakes 
area west of downtown faced three to four feet of water runoff. Police would not allow 
residents in one northwest neighborhood to return home after work, forcing many to sleep 
at the home of a friend or relative. The Review-Journal’s managing editor, John Cahlan, 
cut off from his office, relayed damage reports on the west side of town to the newsroom. 
Senator Richard Bryan, then a senior in high school, remembered enjoying a summer 
date before the intense rain ended the evening. After dropping off his date at her parent’s 
Hyde Park home near Valley View Boulevard and Charleston Boulevard, he spent most 
of the night driving north and south along the railroad tracks attempting to cross. “I had 
to sleep in my car,” Bryan recalled in 2010, “there was no way to cross the tracks 
anywhere in the desert and the underpasses were closed.”35 
 From the time Las Vegas was founded in 1905, residents considered flooding a 
nuisance – roads would be damaged, people stranded at work or home, and utilities 
affected for hours. Usually, the recorded major storm-events occurred in sparsely 
populated rural areas of the Las Vegas valley, the northeast region of Clark County near 
Moapa Valley, Bunkerville, or along the Virgin River. Local officials and “old-timers” 
considered the June 13, 1955, storm to be the worst in Las Vegas since 1923. The 1923 
storm primarily produced lightening and hail damage, while high winds overturned 
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poorly constructed buildings. On the other hand, the 1955 damage came from massive 
flood waters ripping through properties situated on historic waterways. The flood damage 
in the city of Las Vegas surpassed $3 million, one-third of the damages were to private 
residents.36 
 Days after the flooding, the local media began pointing the finger at land 
developers and home builders. “In the old days,” observed one Las Vegas Sun writer, “no 
desert-wise prospector or cattle-raiser would dream of camping in a dry-wash, especially 
with the prospect of a flash-flood.”37 During the city’s expansion in the late 1940s and 
1950s, land sub-dividers developed a habit of ignoring nature to build in areas that were 
dry arroyos, and city and county commissioners let them. Urban hydrology would not 
begin to influence planning in Las Vegas until the late 1960s, but in the arid Southwest, 
the land was visibly scarred by previous washes. After the 1955 flood, Las Vegas 
officials began emphasizing drainage standards for new developments. Major C.D. 
Baker, himself a civil engineer, called for the Las Vegas building permit office to require 
that adequate drainage plans be included in subdivision engineering prior to final 
approval. Las Vegas planners put a stop to dead-end streets in areas where they identified 
drainage issues. Homes on several dead-end streets saw the greatest amount of damage as 
flood waters became damned behind the cul-de-sac’s blocked walls. Even with the city 
hall outcry, little came from the demands for better drainage and building inspection. 
Over the next three decades, as building codes were refined and the valley’s city and 
county governments increasingly formalized planning procedures, developers presented 
engineered drainage systems for approval. However, once the concrete was dry and the 
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homes were built, hardly any neighborhood was inspected to ensure compliance. No 
doubt plenty of money changed hands during the process. Evidence of poor compliance 
with building codes and lax adherence to engineered drainage systems surfaced after 
future floods, creating major life-safety concerns in the valley.38 
 Once the community dried out in late June 1955, officials reported that no lives 
had been lost in the flood waters. Unfortunately, the real tragedy came after the waters 
receded and officials began assessing the damage. Six thousand homes, or nearly half the 
residents in the Las Vegas valley experienced flood damage. Las Vegas-based insurance 
agents estimated that less than $1,000 worth of flood insurance existed in the entire metro 
area. Few people living in the arid Southwest during this time cared to pay $250 for a 
three-year policy for flood insurance. National flood insurance was not available until the 
United States Congress created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in 1968, 
and mandatory flood insurance was not required until 1974.39 
 Prior to the NFIP, massive flood damage relief for affected residents, business and 
municipal services came first from local disaster funds and then from federal emergency 
declarations. Immediately following the damage reports from the flood, Nevada U.S. 
Senator Alan Bible asked a federal emergency team to survey the area for possible 
federal assistance. He informed Las Vegas City Manager A.H. Kennedy that a formal 
request for emergency disaster relief would be sent to Governor Charles Russell, who 
under Public Law 875 would then request President Dwight Eisenhower to declare Las 
Vegas an emergency area. This event began thirty years of local and state officials 
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reaching-out for federal assistance for rehabilitation and construction of flood control 
mitigation projects. 
 Until the passage of the quarter-cent sales tax increase in Clark County for flood 
control in 1986, Southern Nevada experienced a roller-coaster ride in the pursuit of 
federal monies for flood control and disaster relief, especially in 1959 when local and 
state officials requested funding for Army Corps of Engineers’ studies and construction 
projects. The 1970s and early 1980s were fiscally lean years for the Corps, as the Jimmy 
Carter and Ronald Reagan administrations redirected flood mitigation funds to pay for 
projects with greater political capital, such as the Clean Water Act of 1977 and growing 
defense appropriations. Even though in 1986 Clark County voters approved a funding 
measure for flood mitigation and prevention through an increase of the county’s sales tax, 
1962 was the first time Clark County officials requested the community to vote on 
funding a regional flood control system. Voters overwhelmingly rejected the bond 
request, which officials and the media both agreed hurt the area during subsequent floods 
in the 1970s and 1980s. However, research indicates that the flood control system 
designed by the US Corps of Engineers in 1959 would have had disastrous consequences 
for the future of the Las Vegas valley, because it would have restricted growth, not 
allowing for storms originating in different parts of the valley. Also, it would have lacked 
the ability to protect property outside of the system, and would have been expensive to 
build and maintain.40  
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 In 1955, shortly after Governor Russell requested federal emergency funds for the 
Las Vegas area, federal officials dispatched members of the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) and Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) to set up 
temporary offices in Las Vegas to assist the community. The FCDA, eventually covered 
$400,000 in public property damage claims under the federal disaster relief fund 
approved by President Eisenhower. Unfortunately for the community, the relief fund did 
little for the 6,000 affected homes. Federal officials advised property owners to seek bank 
loans first and told claimants that if their loan applications were rejected, they would be 
accepted at the SBA office. Residents, however, had little optimism that support would 
come from the SBA, and local officials expressed frustration at the lack of federal 
assistance for the $3 million in damages. The Las Vegas Review Journal saw irony in the 
Las Vegas flood, portraying it as a replay of the disastrous flood Henderson had 
experienced in 1954. Shortly after that event, Henderson Mayor James B. French had 
requested federal aid to build flood control projects, conduct engineer studies, and receive 
financial support to rebuild. His effort failed, because the Eisenhower administration was 
trying to cut domestic spending and reduce the national debt in the wake of World War II 
and the growing threat of the Cold War.41 
The Great Levee That Nearly Was 
 After the 1955 flood, Senator Bible demanded that the Army Corps of Engineers 
dispatch an emergency response team to Las Vegas to devise a solution to the problem. 
Local officials cautioned residents not to view the Corps’ survey as an immediate 
solution that would protect their homes, roads, and utilities. Funding the project required 
congressional approval, plus flood control studies often took years to complete, due in 
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part to manual analysis of rain gauge information and the time-consuming process of 
drawing by hand topographic maps by hand. The Corps’ engineering team estimated that 
it might take five years before a thorough assessment could be submitted to Las Vegas 
and Clark County officials. Hank Greenspun, the owner of the Las Vegas Sun, provided 
great insight into the funding crisis Southern Nevada would experience over the next 
three decades.42 As he noted,  
The Army Corps of Engineers which can’t talk back to a senator usually bears 
the brunt of these “demands” yet, their budget for such projects as flood control 
is slashed unmercifully. This is an ideal subject for making political hay. There 
aren’t very many damaging floods. The senator can “demand” until Hell freezes 
over, and he knows there isn’t going to be any flood control by the Army Corps 
of Engineers until funds are appropriated for it.43 
 
Nearly all Corps projects required that a percentage of the cost be matched by the local or 
state government. In 1962, Southern Nevada residents were given the opportunity to vote 
on a bond issue to raise $6 million, which would guarantee $25 million in federal monies 
that Congress had set aside to fund the projects identified by the Corps to ease Southern 
Nevada’s flooding problems. On April 6, 1962, voters rejected the bond by a 2-to-1 
margin. 
 The failure of the bond vote is traced backed to the late 1950s; residents had 
become more frustrated by bureaucratic red-tape stretching the repairs to the city’s 
damaged system over years rather than months. Local officials had little recourse; 
Southern Nevada depended on federal funds to solve the flooding problem. Fortunately, 
the community did not experience another major flood in the urban core for the 
remainder of the 1950s, which gave the Army Corps of Engineers enough time to 
complete an extensive survey of the Las Vegas Wash and tributaries. 
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 In 1959, Colonel C.T. Newton presented the Corps’ recommendations to the 
Clark County Commissioners. The plan called for a series of man-made levees and 
massive detention basins to surround Las Vegas, North Las Vegas, and Henderson. The 
largest levee, located on the valley’s west side, would have ranged in height from 4 to 20 
feet above natural ground surface. It would have been located seven miles west of Las 
Vegas, following the same lines as Rainbow Boulevard and parts of Jones Boulevard 
today. Originating northwest of town, at what is now the Craig Road and U.S. 95 
interchange, the levee system would head south, directing flood waters to a massive 10-
square-mile detention basin in the area of Jones and Flamingo Road down to Russell 
Road. The western levee would protect the city from the floods emanating from alluvial 
fans below the Spring Mountains. The Corps’ fifty-year projection of the valley’s 
population in 2000 was a conservative 150,000.44 Fortunately, the agency’s plan was 
never implemented because the Las Vegas area’s 2007 population surpassed 2 million 
people, and the Corps’ 1959 recommendation would have restricted Las Vegas growth 
beyond Rainbow Boulevard.  
Figure 18 illustrates one of the two recommendations the Corps presented to local 
officials. The plan had numerous shortcomings, such as, the city of Henderson would 
have been walled off in three directions, much like a Dutch city waiting for the next 
storm to threaten its dykes. The master planned community of Green Valley would have 
been difficult to build because there were no control measures planned for the massive 
Duck Creek and Pitman washes south of the Las Vegas levee, which presently flow 
through Green Valley, Whitney Ranch, and the communities north of downtown 
                                                 
44 CCRFCD estimated Clark County’s population in 2000 at 1,300,000 and Quickfacts.census.gov 
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Henderson. Under the Corps’ proposed system the city of North Las Vegas had no 
protection. It can be assumed that the engineers in the 1950s did not understand or simply 
ignored the hazards of the Upper Las Vegas Wash and the various alluvial fans coming 
off the Frenchman Mountain and the Ground Gunnery Ranges north of the metro area. 
Ironically, the deadliest storms in the 1970s and early 1980s hit North Las Vegas.   
Potentially the worst consequence of the expansive Las Vegas levee would have 
been the restriction of growth for the suburbs west of downtown and the communities 
planned west of the burgeoning Strip. Looking back, local flood control officials and 
developers speculate if homes could have been built west of the levee they would have 
only been constructed on high ground above the numerous washes and tributaries. The 
vast amount of uninhabitable desert between the homes would have made it nearly 
impossible to justify the cost of running utilities and road improvements to these outlying 
structures. Home owners would have had difficulty obtaining home insurance -- their 
property, the rural road system, and nearby utilities would have been subject to constant 
flood damage. No one could have foreseen that Howard Hughes’s purchase of 25,000 
acres of land on the western edge of the city in 1952 would someday become the 
Summerlin master planned community. But it could not have been built if the Corp’s 
levee system had been installed, because it would not have protected the community. In 
fact, the Summerlin area was later one of the first priorities the CCRFCD addressed in the 
late 1980s. Fortunately, the Red Rock Detention Basin was the first facility built in the 
1990s under the CCRFCD’s master plan; it captures the deadly stormwaters that threaten 
Summerlin and Spring Valley.45    
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Figure 18. US Army Corps of Engineers recommendations for  
a flood control system in the  Las Vegas valley. 
Areas in yellow are the proposed levees, areas in pink are the natural washes46 
 
 
In addition to the Corps’ 1959 recommendations, that same year state lawmakers 
passed Nevada Revised Statue 543 (NRS 543), which outlined the state’s flood control 
policies. Primarily due to budgetary constraints, Las Vegas and Clark County officials 
did not act on the Corps’ proposed system until May 1961, when the county commission 
established the Clark County Flood Control District for the purpose of conducting 
hydrologic studies, acquiring land rights-of-ways, developing flood conveyance, and 
assisting in planning and zoning of the entire county. Prior to the creation of the first 
regional flood control board in 1985, the county commission did not include the other 
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jurisdictions on the flood control district’s managing board. In the 1960s and 1970s there 
was a common power struggle between the City of Las Vegas and county commission. 
After 1985, officials from the entire valley’s jurisdiction comprised the district’s board, 
and the CCRFCD was independently managed.  
Failed Funding for the First Flood Control District 
 During the summer of 1961 county officials were considering the proposed flood 
control system and a funding mechanism when another series of storms hit in August and 
September, flooding streets, damaging homes, and triggering power outages. Finally, 
after six years of public outcries, Las Vegas and Clark County officials moved toward 
definite action. Generating funds for the projects represented the biggest hurdle to 
overcome for the county commission and the newly formed flood district.47 
 Even though the county commission created the flood control district as a 
government agency under NRS 543, the commissioners could not agree on the best 
funding source for the future construction projects. In the end, officials proposed to sell 
bonds. The Corps’ 1959 report estimate the total federal cost of the overall project at 
$13.5 million, which would be roughly $64 million in 2010 dollars. The jurisdictions in 
the valley would have to contribute nearly $5 million for the first phase of construction, 
with an estimated $800,000 in annual new construction and maintenance. In 1962 the 
federal government promised to cover $26 million if Clark County could raise $6 million. 
                                                 
47 “Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) Chapter 543 was originally enacted in 1959.  See Chapter 143, Statutes 
of Nevada 1959, 164, for the enacting language.  The measure, sponsored by legislators from Washoe 
County, provided for a flood control project on the Truckee River in northern Nevada. NRS 543 was 
amended in 1960.  See Chapter 51, Statutes of Nevada 1960, 55, for the amendatory language.  The 
measure, sponsored by the Clark County Delegation, provided for loans from the flood control revolving 
fund to political subdivisions for preliminary costs of flood control and other projects relating to water.” 
Information provided to the author by Jan Wolfley, Assistant Librarian, Nevada Legislative Council, email, 
April 26, 2009. “Bureau Flash Floods threat to Vegas since 1955.”  Las Vegas Review Journal. July 4, 
1975. 
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There was little choice. Indeed, Colonel C.T. Newton of the Corps predicted that the 
metropolitan area would incur nearly $1 million in annual flood damages through the 
1960s and 1970s without a concerted flood control effort.48 
 The major flaw in the Corps’ flood control plan came from their engineers’ 
modeling of the area’s potential flood magnitudes. The system they designed used a 
hypothetical flood with stormwaters equal to a 400-year flood event; a storm of this 
magnitude would generate 7.5 inches of rain in less than six hours over the entire 176 
square miles of the 1960s urban area. That was nearly twice the annual rainfall ever 
recorded. With volumes of water that great, 70 percent of the developed land in the Las 
Vegas valley would be under standing water. It can be argued the Corps’ engineers 
modeling would have drastically altered the physical layout of North Las Vegas, 
Henderson, and the foothill communities of Summerlin and Spring Valley to the west, 
Aliante in the north, and Anthem Seven Hills in Henderson if the Corps’ system had been 
built. 
 Research confirms that growth would not have been totally stopped by a massive 
levee system, but Irene Porter, Executive Director for Southern Nevada Home Builders 
Association, and former Assistant City Planner for North Las Vegas and a Southern 
Nevada resident since 1954, recently noted that the quality of life for those residents 
living outside of the protective walls would have been drastically different. Without a 
system to slow the flow of water coming off the mountains, the devastation would be 
magnified with every new development diverting flood waters through the desert. 
Virginia Valentine, former General Manager for the CCRFCD, envisioned that a vast 
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area outside of the levee system with neighborhoods dotting the landscape at highpoints, 
and barren land subject to flooding would have had extremely high flood insurance 
requirements. Prior to the bond vote in April 1962, a small group of Las Vegas engineers 
questioned the Corps’ aggressive model 49 
 On April 6, 1962, a local group of seven independent practicing consultant 
engineers issued a public statement in the Las Vegas Sun opposing the Corps’ flood 
control plan. The group argued that the huge cost of building and maintaining the 
facilities would more than offset the project’s meager benefits to the community. They 
calculated that the hypothetical storm the Corps’ engineers used to model the system 
produced twice as much rainfall and stormwater as the Las Vegas valley had ever 
experienced. The local group also exposed the inherent flaw of using levee systems as a 
flood control method in the desert. Levees worked best, they argued when holding back 
rising rivers over temporary dams. The group noted that if a high-intensity storm 
occurred inside the Las Vegas metropolitan area, the results could be catastrophic. 
Ironically, the group concluded that the Henderson phase of the flood control project that 
walled off the small town with three massive levees was the best method for protecting 
for the residents. They also urged that steps should taken to establish an area-wide flood 
control management program that brought together all the jurisdictions in Clark County. 
With great foresight they recommended building catchment basins in the foothills of the 
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mountains, and operating the district as a regional group made up of qualified 
representatives from all Clark County communities.50 
 If the $6 million bond sale had passed in 1962, the flood control district would 
have gained access to $26 million from the federal government to build and maintain a 
flood control system. The Las Vegas Sun and Las Vegas Review Journal ran stories 
during the days leading up to the April 10th vote claiming county officials were confident 
voters would approve the bond issue by a substantial majority. Officials waived 
registration requirements for the election; anyone who owned property could vote, the 
argument being the bond money would be generated through an increase in property tax. 
Labor leaders supported the bond because it meant sustainable construction jobs for 
decades to come. The Las Vegas Strip hotels and the Chamber of Commerce backed 
flood control to protect the growing tourist industry. A large advertising campaign 
involving all news media reinforced the idea that the vote would be the last chance valley 
residents would have to receive matching federal funds for flood control projects. Print 
ads supporting the bond peppered both local papers with images of the 1955 flood; the ad 
banners read, “Don’t Let This Happen Again!” and “April 10, 1962, is one of the most 
important days in the history of Southern Nevada.” The day before the vote, Hank 
Greenspun editorialized that “The bond election is the first real effort of the community 
to help itself.” Unfortunately for the bond supporters, voters rejected the bond issue by 
nearly a 2-1 margin resulting in a quarter-century of “patch-work” flood control projects, 
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which never protected the valley from millions of dollars in flood damages throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s.51 
 Voters ignored the warnings of the Army Corps. The Review Journal speculated 
the lack of specific voting information made available to the general public leading up to 
the vote caused its defeat. In addition, it soon became clear that a lot of people simply did 
not know if they were eligible to vote. The “property owners only” specification confused 
too many people. According to the 1960 census, 127, 016 people were living in Clark 
County, but one observer characterized the voter turn-out as “lighter than H20 molecule 
to be exact.” The total number of votes cast was 4,677, 1,705 in favor and 2,972 opposed. 
One editor applauded the result, claiming voters recognized the extreme burden local 
officials had been putting on property owners with road, water, school and airport bonds. 
Indeed the Review Journal cited the loaming $6 million bond for the Las Vegas Valley 
Water District in November as a factor for a flood control bond going down to defeat. It 
demonstrated, the newspaper argued, that Nevadans in 1962 viewed federal matching 
funds as “handouts” that in the long run would come from the taxpayers. Clearly, the 
conservative tendency of local voters combined with the high-cost of Las Vegas’ growth 
defeated the bonds in 1962 and discouraged further flood control initiatives for another 
quarter century. Ironically, the bond failure proved beneficial. As this thesis will argue, 
the bond’s failure to fund the massive levee and channel system ensured that the rapid 
physical expansion of the Las Vegas valley through the 80s, 90s, and the early 2000s 
would not be hampered. The Corps’ projects would have drastically affected the area’s 
ability to expand, primarily because the Corps’ large levee system designed to protect Las 
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Vegas, North Las Vegas, and Henderson in the 1960s would have cut off hundreds of 
square miles from being developed properly, as well as not protecting the cities from 
future floods that would occur when massive storms soaked the communities inside the 
levee system.52 
 In 1975, one local reporter cynically described the 1962 vote as being affected by 
the blue skies on that Election Day, suggesting the shortsighted view the community 
generally approached flood control with lacked consideration for their neighbors’ 
wellbeing. It would be twenty-four years before Clark County residents would have 
another opportunity to approve comprehensive funding for a flood control plan. In the 
interim, the separate entities: Clark County, Las Vegas, North Las Vegas, Henderson, 
Boulder City, and the outlying areas of the community each had to fend for themselves. 
Each did its best to provide flood protection for its constituents, but political firction 
between the fractured entities made even the simplest of solution problematic. Through 
the late 1960s and 1970s county engineers planned and recommended county-wide 
mitigation projects, but with no regulatory power, the local entities did not approve or 
enforce many of the measures. As the valley grew, the majority of the time the flood 
control district planned around an entity’s specific needs or scrapped the plans entirely. In 
addition, local projects lacked reliable, steady sources of funding to plan and construct 
sufficient control structures. Many of the problems the Clark County Regional Flood 
Control District would encounter in the 1990s came from the 1960s and 1970s “patch 
work” projects and the internecine warfare between the various city and county public 
works agencies. Improvements were made usually after each major deluge, an approach 
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local urban planners characterized as, “rain-flood-fix-improve-wait for next storm.” This 
scenario would repeat itself until 1986, when voters finally approved an equitable and 
sustainable funding method to build a flood control system through an increase in county 
sales tax. After more than three decades, voters finally realized that flooding threatened 
Las Vegas’ national image and therefore its continued growth. At the same time, city and 
county leaders also recognized the need for a metropolitan solution to the flood threat.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
53
19
“Rain
Swirlin
 
                   
 “Where I Stan
62 flood contr
, which is be
 It
g, cascadin
Figure 19
The Fla
                   
d” by Hank G
ol bond electi
neficial eve
 comes seldo
It never
g waters rav
.  Flooded c
mingo Hilto
(Courtesy 
        
reenspun, the 
on. Las Vegas 
52 
CHAPTER
 
1962-198
 
rywhere els
m but when
 rains but th
age a lands
ars in the Ca
n in the bac
of ClassicL
 
owner and edit
Sun April 9, 1
 III 
0 
e, is harmfu
 it does, loo
at it floods. 
cape as effe
esars Palac
kground, Ju
asVegas.com
or of the Las V
962. 
l in Southern
k out.  
 
ctively as dr
e parking lo
ly 3, 1975. 
) 
egas Sun on t
 Nevada. 
ought.”53 
t.  
he eve of the f
 
 
 
ailed 
53 
 
Failure at the Polls 
Even before the last votes had been counted on April 10, 1962, city and county 
officials knew the voters had rejected the bond request. As Dick Sauser, Las Vegas 
Public Works Director, stated in an April 12, 1962, interview, “The issue failed, but a 
provision still must be provided.” He suggested digging a protective moat at Rainbow 
Boulevard along the Army Corps of Engineers proposed levee system. “The protection,” 
Sauer asserted, “must come from our western area.” During that same time, Nevada’s 
U.S. Senator Howard Cannon requested that the federal matching funds be advanced to 
Clark County without local participation. Unfortunately, by the end of 1962, both 
requests failed – Sauer’s recommendation to build the moat lost momentum because 
neighborhoods had been under construction west of the Corps’ proposed levee system 
even prior to the April vote, plus the community did not experience another flood until 
1967. Colonel Boyd Yaden, the consulting engineer for the Army Corps of Engineers, 
considered Senator Cannon’s request but inevitably Washington D.C. did not bend on its 
requirement that matching local funds had to be secured before any money from the 
Corps could be spent.54 
 Over the next decade, the local flood control offices operated with different 
priorities: the City of Las Vegas worried about its expanding border to the west, while 
Clark County focused on protecting growth on the Strip. Flood control was typically 
under the public works department and always operated with a limited budget provided 
by city and county commissioners in response to flood damage. The 1972-1973 budgets 
for the county flood control district allotted a scant $35,441. Throughout the 1960s and 
                                                 
54 Las Vegas Sun, April 12, 1962. Eugene Moehring, Resort City in the Sunbelt: Las Vegas, 1930-2000. 
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1970s flood control was left to developers; local governments loosely regulated the 
“patch-work” system. Clearly, there was no public oversight to prevent construction in 
flood-prone areas because in 1966, despite warnings from geologist and the Army Corps 
of Engineers, Jay Sarno opened Caesars Palace on the edge of the Flamingo Wash. The 
construction contractors paved a portion of the wash that ran through the property to 
expand its north parking lot. This would prove to be a costly mistake when a massive 
flood on July 3, 1975, ripped down the Flamingo Wash destroying nearly 300 
automobiles in the resort’s parking lot. The flood prompted promoters and local officials 
to begin worrying about flooding’s impact on Las Vegas’ national image. Also threatened 
were newly constructed homes and apartments lining the banks of the Flamingo and 
Tropicana Washes east behind today’s Imperial Palace and west of the Strip. 
 By the mid-1960s the resort economy flourished, pricing downtown residential 
lots out of existence and forcing many homeowners to sell to commercial developers. 
Families were attracted to the newly emerging suburbs south and east of the city. During 
this time the valley saw the first substantial efforts by city and county planning agencies 
to bring order to the central city as well as the growing edges of the metro area along 
Decatur Road, Tropicana Avenue, Smoke Ranch Road, and east of Boulder Highway. 
The water and sanitation districts implemented a bold construction program during the 
1960s. In less than a decade, water and sanitation master plans brought a coordinated and 
orderly infrastructure to the community’s periphery. These utility connections opened 
large areas of land for developers to build in the desert, which allowed isolated 
neighborhoods to tie into the growing water and sewage system. But ominously, Clark 
County officials did not regard comprehensive flood control as vital to the expanding 
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network. Local building and planning departments were merely concerned with flood 
control on a neighborhood and property level, approving a developer’s channel and pipes 
installation even if it stopped at the end of the property-line and possibly increased the 
flooding risks to down-stream communities. 
 Urban expansion was promoted by the construction of large auto corridors 
crossing the entire valley – Tropicana Avenue, Flamingo Road, Desert Inn Road, 
Charleston Boulevard and Vegas Drive running east-west. The major north-south routes 
were Rainbow Boulevard, Decatur Road, Las Vegas Boulevard (the Strip), Eastern 
Boulevard, Lamb/Sandhill Road, and Nellis Boulevard. Local public works departments 
kept road construction costs down by designing roads to run over the natural terrain. In a 
2010 interview, Paul Christensen, a former Las Vegas City and Clark County 
Commissioner, recalled approving Press Lamb, who was the County Supervisor in the 
1970s and the main road builder in Southern Nevada, to pave existing dirt roads over the 
desert’s natural “hills and dales.” Lamb did a great job of paving roads very quickly in 
the valley. Christensen recalled nicknaming new roads “Press Lamb Specials.” This type 
of road construction worked well when the town was small; paving over the existing dirt 
road and not having to raise it over the natural washes meant the community could open 
up large chunks of desert without spending a large amount of local tax dollars. 
Unfortunately by the 1980s, this policy of not building bridges or installing drainage 
pipes in the larger washes in the periphery made it impossible to travel across town and 
almost always caused major road damage during even minor storms. Through the late 
1990s, 2000s and into present day, it is a common site during heavy rainfalls to see 
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automobiles backed upon either side of a flooded section of road in less populated areas 
of the valley that had not been raised over washes (fig 20).55 
  
 
Figure 20. State Route 159 near Red Rock Conservation Area, December 22, 2010. 
(photo credit to Las Vegas Sun) 
 
 
Into the 1960s, local public works officials had not recognized how stormwater 
was affected by urbanization. Finally in 1968, the American Society of Civil Engineers 
(ASCE) conducted a national survey of major studies on urban stormwater runoff. The 
ASCE concluded that engineers and urban planners should consider the possibility of 
modifying land-development and drainage practices to reduce peak flow rates. As the 
United States expanded its road network, suburbs mushroomed on the periphery of all 
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major metropolitan areas. As more people moved into the arid Southwest, road 
construction drastically affected natural stormwater drainage systems. Communities 
located in areas of the Sunbelt that experienced intense rain storms such as Riverside, 
California, Phoenix, Albuquerque, and Las Vegas had to develop systems for controlling 
upstream waters exiting onto a community and potentially impacting downstream places. 
 During the late 1960s, survey hydrologist Luana Leopold wrote a guide to 
hydrology for urban planning. Leopold’s suggestions became the basis for a new concept, 
“blue-green development.” In the 1970s the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) 
coined this phrase. The basic idea was to combine stormwater storage and open space. 
Rather than constructing large artificial drainage channels in urbanized areas to divert 
water around existing structures, the developer would create natural catchment basins and 
ponds in each neighborhood to store it. This practice is also called “stormwater 
harvesting.” By the early 1970s, the idea had shaped the development of a number of 
projects, from a low-cost subdivision in El Paso to the celebrated “new town” of 
Woodland, Texas.56 
 By the mid-1970s the U.S. Department of Agriculture had forty-two research 
facilities across the nation working on stormwater harvesting. The department had two 
labs in Arizona, one in Phoenix and another in Tucson. The Phoenix lab designed 
systems for individual buildings to capture and bank stormwater, which could be used for 
irrigation or waste water conveyance. Today, stormwater banking has become a vital 
component for developers pursuing the highest Leadership in Energy and Environmental 
Design (LEED) Platinum rating; to be considered, the structure must have a water 
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collection system in place. The Tucson lab worked on stormwater harvesting, which is 
the practice of capturing water on each development in ponds or artificial lakes. Then in 
1972 Congress passed the Clean Water Act, which set targets for pollutants, which 
increased the importance of capturing stormwater, as well as commercial and residential 
runoff, before it enters natural waterways. Environmental officials argued that the 
country’s water system would be permanently affected by man-made pollutants like oil, 
grease and pesticides if something was not done. Proponents such as Luna Leopold 
stressed that stormwater harvesting in catchment ponds would absorb the pollutants. 
However, it is important to understand that harvesting is only successful in areas that 
have enough rainfall to recharge the ponds. In the arid Southwest where the basin would 
be empty for months on end, it would require communities to recharge the basins with 
valuable water. Typically, land values are too high to remove large portions of a new 
development for harvesting. By having catchment ponds in Las Vegas the shallow salty 
aquifer would also be recharged, causing the water to resurface through the areas natural 
springs, and after making its way downstream, negatively affecting the fragile ecosystem 
of the Las Vegas Wetlands – an ecosystem that is vital to the natural treatment of waste 
water coming out of the valley before entering Lake Mead.57 
 Another major change to flood water policy came in 1968 when Congress 
established the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) under the Nation Flood 
Insurance Act of 1968. The NFIP is a federal program enabling property owners in 
participating communities to purchase insurance subsidized by the government. This was 
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a watershed piece of legislation, for areas struggling with flooding. For Las Vegas, it was 
difficult to enact appropriate building codes, agree on engineering designs for flood 
control systems, punish developers who did not comply with established codes, and most 
importantly, provide affordable flood insurance. Until 1968 federal actions related to 
flooding were primarily responses to significant events. Local and federal officials used 
structural measures to control flooding, such as dams, levees, and channels. Generally, 
the only available financial resource to help flood victims was federal disaster assistance 
that was hard to get declared and government officials forced communities to navigate a 
maze of bureaucratic paperwork. 
 Despite funding under the Flood Control Act of 1936, which attempted to tackle 
the growing threat of flooding along America’s rivers and coastal areas, billions of 
dollars were invested in structural flood-control projects in the mid twentieth-century. 
Unfortunately, as more flood control structures were built, the losses to life and property 
and the amount of assistance to flood disaster victims continued to increase. As early as 
the 1950s, federal officials proposed flood insurance, but it was clear that private 
insurance companies could not profitably provide such coverage at an affordable rate 
because of the catastrophic nature of flood events and the inability to develop actuarial 
tables that could reflect the risk of flood-prone areas. In response to the private insurance 
companies’ inability to offer cost effective policies, the federal government took over the 
insurance program in 1965, first under the Federal Insurance Agency, and then in 1979 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) became the permanent managing 
agency.58 
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 The NFIP required communities to follow strict national floodplain management 
standards laid out in the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968. For example, commercial 
and residential finished floors had to be 12-inches above an established community’s 
100-year flood level; structures in areas prone to river or coastal flooding had to be 
constructed with flood-resistant materials, and property dividing-walls had to contain 
openings that would permit the automatic entry and exit of floodwaters. The program also 
called for the Federal Insurance Agency to map all areas of the country in order to 
uncover regional flood risk.59 
In December 1968 Robert C. Weaver, the first Secretary of the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, delegated authority for administering the NFIP to the 
Federal Insurance Agency (FIA). That same month the Flood Insurance Rate Study and 
Map (FIRM) program began. It required that every community in America be mapped 
and rated to create a flood hazard probability. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 
agreed to assist FIA in outlining individual floodplain boundaries, using existing 
topographic maps and aerial surveys of specific regions. In the same year the Army 
Corps of Engineers completed a six-year study that identified 5,000 flood-prone 
communities across the nation. There was an immediate recognition that scientific 
mapping of the major floodways could not be done within the time frame specified by the 
1968 legislation, so the act was amended in December 1969 to authorize an “Emergency 
Program,” which allowed for the creation of Flood Hazard Boundary Maps (FHNM) or 
“Flat Maps” (fig 21).  
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Figure 21. Flat map from Maine. 
 
 
These maps displayed no topographical features and had little useful information 
on them, so it was difficult to determine whether a specific property was within a 
floodplain. Through the early 1970s, the federal government offered limited amounts of 
insurance to participating communities who were waiting on USGS and FIA to complete 
the mapping. By the end of 1973, the FIA estimated there were 13,000 flood-prone 
communities.  
In 1973 Congress passed the Flood Disaster Protection Act mandating purchase of 
flood insurance for all structures within a flood-zone. Congress also prohibited federal 
agencies from providing financial assistance in the wake of a flood disaster to any 
community that did not participate in NFIP by July 1, 1975. Drastic changes in federal 
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regulations forced city and county officials, local builders, and urban planners to 
reevaluate their land development policies.60 
Another important piece of legislation came in 1973. The NFIP established 
floodplain management regulations for Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHAs), which is 
land lying within the floodplain of a community. The SFHAs are subject to a 1 percent or 
greater chance of flooding in any given year, which is the community’s 100-year flood 
equivalent. It was virtually impossible for the USGS team to survey every mile of flood-
prone land or complete the appropriate studies to determine if a specific area within a 
region qualified as a SFHA. Consequently, the original maps provided a broad-based 
view of each community’s topographical features and did a poor job of accurately 
identifying homes or undeveloped land that sat in a flood-zone, causing a great deal of 
confusion for participating communities and their code enforcement departments. Then in 
April 1979 the Department of Housing and Urban Development transferred the NFIP 
over to the newly created Federal Emergency Management Agency. Shortly after taking 
over the program, FEMA spent millions of dollars to ensure that the appropriate lands 
were under SFHA and remove the ones that lay outside of floodplains.  
During this same period local officials and builders were still taking major risks 
by continuing the nearly criminal practice of straddling flood plains with little regard to 
risk of life and property. It should be noted that the cities of Las Vegas, North Las Vegas 
and Henderson were able to participate in the NFIP by 1980. In fact, shortly after the 
NFIP applications were given out to communities in 1974, the City of North Las Vegas 
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completed the appropriate paperwork and flew Irene Porter, its Assistant Planning 
Director, to San Francisco to submit the first application from Southern Nevada.61  
It took Clark County until the 1990s to qualify for participation in the NFIP. 
Present-day CCRFCD officials speculate the delay in the county’s participation was due 
in part to FEMA prioritizing mapping for communities with a higher risk of flooding and 
with larger population centers; up through the early 1980s the county was still sparsely 
populated. Research suggests that the decades of mismanagement and patch-work 
construction of flood control came back to haunt county officials. It took the county’s 
public works department and flood control officials nearly fifteen years to improve the 
system in order to participate in the program. It can also be concluded that the strict NFIP 
building codes, which Clark County officials began enforcing in the early 1980s, allowed 
for compact, sustained and rapid growth in the metropolitan area through out the 1990s 
and early 2000s.62 
By the twenty-first century, CCRFCD’s success in mitigating floods had 
propelled Clark County into the forefront of FEMA’s effort to modernize floodplain 
mapping in the digital age. In 2002, Clark County was the first community to receive a 
Digital Flood Insurance Rate Map (D-FIRM), which provides information for evaluating 
flood hazards through computerized modeling as a community’s development evolves 
and changes natural floodplains with streets, walls and bulldozes surfaces. This paper 
concludes that the pressure of the NFIP and FEMA did not force the cities and county to 
reform seventy years of short-sighted flood control, but in fact it can be traced back to the 
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community’s response to the massive July 3, 1975, Caesars Palace flood and a 1980 
liability lawsuit filed by a local resident, Albert Powers.63 
The Caesars Palace Flood 
 In 1966 Caesars Palace opened with great fanfare and excitement. It was one of 
the largest resorts in the world at the time with its Roman-themed interior and majestic 
fountains. The property, which is still situated on the northwest corner of Flamingo Road 
and the Strip, was built adjacent to the Flamingo Wash. Portions of the north parking lot 
dipped through the wash and were used as a flood control channel to divert stormwater 
around the property (fig 22). During the resort’s early years when stormwater poured in 
from the west, floods covered that part of the lot in the wash, as water flowed under the 
Strip and the Flamingo Capri (where the Imperial Palace is presently located), past the 
Flamingo Hilton, on its way toward Lake Mead. Caesars’ management posted signs on 
light poles warning patrons that the area was subject to flash flooding. Over the years the 
maintenance staff painted a yellow line on each side of the wash, running the length of 
the property to show the high-water mark. By the mid-1970s the popularity of Caesars 
Palace had grown, and more visitors came each year to experience its themed 
atmosphere. Many out-of-state tourists as well as local residents parked in the wash, 
ignoring the posted warnings of potential flood hazards. Periodically a flash flood would 
sweep away a vehicle parked in the wash (fig 23), but for the first ten years of the 
property’s operation, patrons avoided parking in the wash. 
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Figure 22. Top right of the image shows the north lot and the wash, March 3, 1975.  
(Image courtesy of the Las Vegas News Bureau.)  
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Figure 23. September 12, 1969 west side of the Strip at the Flamingo Wash 
(Image courtesy of the Las Vegas News Bureau) 
 
For a while the lack of floods through the Flamingo Wash created a false sense of safety. 
Even the Caesars Palace security staff stopped enforcing the property’s “No Parking” rule 
in the wash – so, on July 3, 1975, hundreds of patrons’ cars were parked there. 
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 Local officials and casino owners were gearing up for a busy Fourth of July 
weekend. All the hotels along the Strip and downtown were completely booked. Many 
eager visitors arrived in town mid-week to enjoy the entertainment and relax before the 
weekend’s big crowds arrived. On Thursday, July 3 there were dark thunder clouds over 
the western Spring Mountains, but on the Strip it was sunny and hot. As the storm clouds 
grew darker, Caesars Palace security kept in close contact with the metro police, whose 
helicopter was surveying the rainfall in the mountains. Shortly before 4 p.m., a Caesars 
Palace security guard radioed dispatch with a frantic message that a two to three foot wall 
of water was rushing under I-15 toward the property. The brown, debris filled water 
slammed into hundreds of cars parked in the restricted area of Caesars Palace’s north lot. 
Along the way, this torrent of water had collected trees, brush, man-made garbage that 
had been dumped in the desert, as well as large amounts of soil and rocks.  
The force of the rampaging water lifted cars off the ground, literally creating 
hundreds of boats. Seconds after the river of stormwater invaded the lot, cars and debris 
lodged up against the drainage culvert under the Strip. The combination of cars, debris 
and the angled culvert supports, caused the water to pond and eventually to overflow onto 
the Strip. Fortunately for Caesars Palace, The Flamingo Hilton and the Holiday Inn 
(which is now the Harrah’s Las Vegas), the flood waters crested just inches from each 
resort’s front entrance. It should also be noted that the Imperial Palace, which would have 
sat directly in the floods path, had not yet been built.64 
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Figure 24. July 3, 1975 Clark County Public Works situated a crane on the Strip 
to remove cars. 
(Image courtesy of the Las Vegas News Bureau) 
 
 
 Shortly after the stormwater subsided, emergency crews mobilized and worked 
with Clark County public works staff to bring in a large crane that removed cars stuck in 
the drainage culvert. Crews worked through the night and into the Fourth of July lifting 
more than 200 cars out of the wash and Caesars’ parking lot. Numerous insurance firms 
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set up temporary offices in Caesars to process claims over the weekend. Ironically, the 
clean up on the Strip was hampered by hundreds of tourist and curious sightseers who 
swarmed into the area to watch the cleanup efforts, taking pictures and wading through 
the muddy sidewalks. Extra police had to be called in to control the crowds. 
 
 
Figure 25. July 4, 1975, view from Caesars Palace of the massive clean up effort. 
Image courtesy of the CCRFCD 
 
 
70 
 
This was the first major Las Vegas flood to make national news. Indeed, as 
former Chairman of the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority and former Clark 
County Commissioner, Jay Bingham recalled in a 2010 interview, the Caesars Palace 
flood was the first time a Southern Nevada natural disaster had ever made national news. 
Also in 2010, Senator Richard Bryan remembered receiving calls from all over the 
country from friends and family fearing for his family’s safety. “They must be crazy,” he 
thought that day; “It had not rained a drop near my downtown office.” People in other 
parts of the Untied States saw images of the Caesar Palace parking lot flooding and 
assumed the entire city was underwater, when in fact the storm that produced the flood 
waters was more than five miles west of the Strip.65 
 For people living outside of the arid Southwest, flooding typically occurs when a 
swollen river crests its banks or a levee breaches. As discussed in chapter one, riverine 
flooding, most commonly resulted from long sustained rainfall or when large amounts of 
snow melt enter an area’s watershed system, or from massive hurricanes. For decades, 
images have peppered newspapers or been captured on the national evening news 
programs of residents working to create man-made levees of sandbags along a swollen 
river in an effort to protect homes and businesses from flooding, or costal residents 
fleeing days or maybe hours before a hurricane made land-fall. The common thread 
between all these types of floods is time. Riverine flooding is typically slow, sometimes 
taking days or weeks to reach flood status.  
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 Unlike riverine flooding, the rain storms that cause flooding in the arid Southwest 
are very intense, short, isolated thunderstorms. After the 1975 Caesars Palace flood, it 
became apparent to the local leaders that a localized flood event could be taken out of 
context and magnified by the national media to the long-term detriment of Las Vegas’s 
tourist industry. The rest of the nation lacked experience with these types of storms. 
People did not understand that a flood could be raging in one part of the valley, while less 
than a mile away, the land could be completely dry and its residents oblivious to the 
destruction going on. By the late 1970s, local officials, casino owners, and city promoters 
become more aware of the nation’s negative perception of Las Vegas during rain storms. 
It became apparent by the early 1980s that tourism was being threatened and even hurt 
especially in summer by the community’s lack of flood control. Cancellation of room 
reservations spiked in the wake of every major flood event in the Las Vegas valley. 
Resort owners like Ralph Engelstad of the Imperial Palace and Jay Sarno at Caesars 
Palace pressured the Clark County Commissioners to address the flooding problem to the 
west of the Strip. The Caesars Palace flood also marked a turning point in the way 
Southern Nevadans viewed human interaction with flood waters.66 
 The deaths of two North Las Vegas traffic engineers only reinforced the 
community’s resolve to fix the flood problem. Shortly after the stormwater entered the 
Caesars Palace parking lot, North Las Vegas officials dispatched road workers ahead of 
the storm. Crews were attempting to barricade low lying roads and wash crossings to 
keep people out of danger. Mike Williams and Richard Hunkins were working two miles 
west of I-15, near the intersection of Craig Road and Losee Road, putting up road blocks 
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at the Upper Las Vegas Wash crossing. By the time the storm reached North Las Vegas, 
Irene Porter and Dewayne Sudwick, the city’s Public Works Director, were in a 
helicopter surveying the rainfall over the French Mountains north of the city. Porter 
recalled in 2010, observing a large sheet flood, which was “a couple of feet deep and very 
wide,” flowing from the mountains at a high velocity. “Dewayne and I got on the radio,” 
she remembered, “advising all city employees to get out of the area near the Upper Las 
Vegas Wash.” Porter received the all-clear signal over her 2-way radio just prior to the 
flood waters channeling into the natural washes and existing flood channels. It was later 
discovered that Williams and Hunkins crossed back over the wash at Craig and Lossee to 
retrieve road barriers they feared would be swept away. When they attempted to return, 
the rising waters had enough force to sweep their truck down the wash. Observers 
reported seeing one of the men climb out of a side-window and scramble onto the truck’s 
roof. The water’s force combined with the buoyancy of the tires rolled the truck over. 
The next day members of the Clark County Coroner’s office located both men’s bodies a 
few miles downstream from where they were last seen.67 
 The deaths of Williams and Hunkins and the hundreds of wrecked cars illegally 
parked in the wash at Caesars Palace raised major questions about personal accountability 
when it came to human interaction with flood waters. Research shows that poor human 
judgment caused the sixty-seven flood-related deaths recorded from 1960 to 2007 and the 
countless swift water rescues conducted during Las Vegas’s history. Clearly, the loss of 
life was a result of flooding is troubling, but people driving into waters, parking cars in 
posted flash flood zones, or playing in washes raised the question in the minds of some 
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about whether these people could be called “flood victims.” By the 1990s local officials 
began to consider those who entered flood waters as foolish and irresponsible. Some 
officials even threatened to fine people who willingly entered flooded areas and required 
emergency services. Since 1986, the CCRFCD has spent thousands of dollars on 
educational out-reach and public service campaigns in the hopes that people will think 
twice before entering flood waters. 
 But in 1975 it was the governments in the metropolitan area that most people 
considered foolish and irresponsible for their lack of flood control planning. It was 
shortly after the 1975 flood when Albert Powers, a private home owner in the southeast 
part of Las Vegas, filed a lawsuit in the Clark County District Court that would become 
the watershed case for establishing flood damage liability. The prosecution claimed Clark 
County officials had not taken reasonable care to avoid flooding of existing homes in the 
southeast part of the valley. The lawsuit also claimed the county was guilty of approving 
new private developments at the cost of existing property owners. This case went all the 
way to the Nevada Supreme Court in 1980. For the first time in the valley’s eighty-year 
history, government entities were held liable for flooding caused by development. The 
impact of the Supreme Court’s decision hastened the local governments’ efforts to 
develop a comprehensive flood control solution, because flood waters do not respect 
political boundaries. In the 1980s and 1990s, more than 1,000 lawsuits were filed; 
claiming developers, engineers and local public works departments did not design or 
build adequate facilities to protect existing properties.68 
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County of Clark v. Powers 
 During the late 1950s and early 1960s Powers had purchased various properties in 
Clark County and developed those properties for residential use. One parcel of land was 
near the present-day corner of Desert Inn Road and Eastern Avenue, just east of the Las 
Vegas International Golf Course and the country club community on the course. The 
development was integrated into the County’s master drainage plan for the southeast part 
of the valley. In 1980 the District Court found Clark County guilty, by its own planning, 
designing, engineering, and construction activities, as well as its adoption of the plans of 
private developers that altered the natural washes and streams west of the Powers’ 
property. The County filled, leveled, graded, compacted, and paved many areas near the 
intersection of Desert Inn and Topaz Road, northeast of the Powers and Lawrence Lowe 
Properties to accommodate new homes and commercial buildings along Desert Inn. Prior 
to these reconstruction efforts, the curb and gutter system along Desert Inn was designed 
specifically to divert and channel stormwater and direct its flow east toward the Flamingo 
Wash, which crossed Desert Inn a mile and a half east of the Topaz intersection.69 
 Once the redesign of the Desert Inn and Topaz intersection was completed in late 
1967, the land and road were four feet above the Powers and Lowe’s property lines. The 
county installed rock-lined culverts to divert water from a newly constructed grocery 
store north of the two properties. The water was channeled to a county maintained 
drainage pipe that collected water in various culverts and discharged it onto Powers and 
Lowe’s parcels. To make matters worse, the county entered both properties, without 
permission, and built a concrete and rock berm to keep stormwaters from exiting their 
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properties. The cumulative effort of the County’s construction activities increased and 
accelerated the flow of water through the natural stream located near their homes. The 
water that was previously draining down Desert Inn to the Flamingo Wash had now been 
diverted by county engineers into the small stream system.70 
 During the 1975 Caesars Palace flood and continuing through the early part of 
1976, the parcels were deluged by constant flowing water. Subsequently in 1976, the 
county installed a large drainpipe west of the properties, which increased flooding of 
homes around Powers. In 1977, attorney Brent Leavitt of Las Vegas filed a lawsuit in 
District Court on behalf of Albert Powers, Lawrence Lowe, Rufus Wallace, George 
Rodrigues and Joseph Rodrigues. The suit was based on the theory of inverse 
condemnation, which is defined as an action brought by a property owner for 
compensation from a government entity that has taken the owner’s property without 
bringing formal condemnation proceedings.71 Leavitt argued the county should have 
provided just compensation through the law of eminent domain if it had desired to 
incorporate his land into its flood control system. After twelve days of testimony, District 
Court Judge Howard W. Babcock found that the county had taken Powers and the other 
plaintiff’s parcels in their entirety. In effect, Babcock ruled that the properties no longer 
had a practical use other than as a flood channel. The county appealed, claiming it had 
always been immune from liability for damages caused by urbanization. But in a 
landmark 1980 decision, the Nevada Supreme Court found that the government entities, 
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developers, and engineers had to take into account the full cost of development to the 
entire community prior to construction.72 
 The District Court and Supreme Court agreed that Clark County, as well as the 
other local governments, had to take careful consideration of each of the public and 
private land users. As Supreme Court Chief Justice John Mowbray stated, “Growth and 
urbanization are not unduly restricted, but merely tempered with elements of order, 
planning and reasonableness.”73 His opinion on the tempering of growth with order and 
planning would become the key principle guiding Las Vegas metropolitan’s rapid 
expansion from the late 1980s to today. County of Clark v. Powers also forced local 
planning agencies to reassess the flood control system in the Las Vegas valley or face the 
possibility of future lawsuits in the wake of flooding. Gone were the days of simply 
approving drainage plans for individual homes and neighborhoods on good-faith 
agreements between developers and local building permit departments. After 1980, 
planning personnel had to ensure that the existing community would not be adversely 
affected by future growth. Without a comprehensive flood control plan to correct decades 
of mistakes, local governments ran the risk of carrying the liability for the poor decision 
of previous public works employees and elected officials. Research shows that the Las 
Vegas valley was only able to grow in an orderly manner, because after 1980 officials 
started correcting existing flood control problems and held developers to a higher 
standard for new construction. 
 For the Las Vegas valley to become one of the fastest-growing communities in 
the United States during the last two decades of the twentieth century there had to be a 
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comprehensive flood control plan approved by the metropolitan area’s five government 
entities. History proved that with each entity working independent of the others, it would 
have been virtually impossible to complete a regional system to convey water through the 
valley. There was no framework in place to design a system, prioritize projects, and more 
importantly, fund the construction of the facilities. Looking back, politicians, developers, 
casino executives, and long time residents all agree that flooding was the catalyst that 
helped unify the five local governments. These entities had to come together under a 
regional umbrella in order to tackle the flood issue. Aside from solving the flood control 
problem in the region, many considered the creation of the Clark County Regional Flood 
Control District in 1985 as the first major step toward the City of Las Vegas and Clark 
County working together to assist the metro area’s growth.74 In the 1990s the regional 
approach of the CCRFCD produced a working model for other special service districts 
such as education, police, libraries, and water. It was the first district to adopt a master 
plan to address current issues while developing a systematic approach for the future 
expansion of Clark County’s urban networks.75 It was also the first district to use a 
citizen’s advisory committee to monitor funding allocations as well as being a 
community outreach group to promote the vital need for a regional flood control 
district.76 
 In the summer of 1981 there was no flood district and no clear plan for solving 
eighty years of mistakes and negligence. Then on August 12, 1981, the communities of 
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Moapa and Overton, northeast of the Las Vegas, were nearly destroyed by a series of 
storms that produced flood waters equivalent to a 500-year flood event. From 1981 to 
1986, central Clark County was hit by massive flooding every summer. Unlike previous 
floods, no community was spared during this devastating period. Research has traced the 
support for regional flood control back to the storms of 1981-1985; each summer more 
people died and the property damages were greater each year. It would take Clark County 
Commissioner Bruce Woodbury and Nevada State Assemblyman Jim McGaughey to 
design the CCRFCD in 1985 and then, a concerted effort by a small but highly effective 
group of dedicated residents, developers, government employees and politicians to 
convince Clark County voters to approve a funding mechanism for flood control in 1986. 
The dedication of the group Woodbury and McGaughey assembled in 1985 helped 
protect lives and property. In addition, their efforts permanently reshaped the physical 
landscape of the Las Vegas valley over the next two decades.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
1981-1985 
 
 
“United we stand, divide we drown.”77 
     
 
 
Figure 26. Las Vegas August 11, 1983  
(image courtesy of CCRFCD) 
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general session. Las Vegas Review Journal, March, 5 1985. 
80 
 
The Endless Summers of Storms  
The catalyst that finally moved the Las Vegas valley’s leaders and voters to unite 
behind the creation of a valley-wide flood control district were a series of disastrous 
floods that hammered the area between 1981 and 1986. Following Robert Broadbent’s 
1981 decision to leave the Clark County Commission and become head of the U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation, Republican Governor Robert List appointed fellow Republican 
lawyer Bruce Woodbury to replace him.  
 During the summer of 1981, Woodbury’s district was hit hard by massive 
flooding. On August 10, 1981, the communities of Overton and Moapa experienced a 
flood several times larger than the statistical 100-year flood flow rates for that region of 
the county. The summer storms caused thousands of dollars in property damage, killed 
hundreds of cattle, and washed out miles of railroad track along the Lake Mead Branch of 
the Union Pacific line. Woodbury noted in a 2009 interview that flooding become his 
primary focus after he surveyed the devastation. Over the next two years he attempted to 
gain support for flood control in the state assembly, but failed. That summer and into 
1984, massive flooding across Southern Nevada finally forced legislators to address the 
concerns raised by Woodbury and others.78 
 During this time local courts began seeing a growing number of flood-related 
lawsuits. Even prior to the 1980 Nevada Supreme Court decision in favor of Albert 
Powers, victims of the 1975 Caesars Palace flood were still in the courts trying to 
negotiate proper settlements. In 1978 the local insurance defense firm of Crommer, 
Barker and Michelson, the primary firm representing Clark County, handled more than a 
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hundred lawsuits following the June 3, 1975, flood. In 1978 the firm hired Michael 
Mansfield, a young lawyer, to take over the mountain of depositions and evidence 
collected during the period since the flood. From 1978 through the early 2000s, 
Mansfield was the de facto flood defense expert in Southern Nevada. He spent much of 
the first decade across the aisle from Brent Leavitt – the lawyer who won the County of 
Clark v. Powers case and became known as the “the muddy-water attorney.”79   
 Looking back, both Mansfield and Leavitt in recent interviews agreed that the 
flood problem that Clark County faced the 1980s was magnified by poor government 
oversight in the cities and county planning and building permit departments. Even though 
in 1981 Bruce Woodbury blamed the Union Pacific Railroad’s poor drainage system for 
the massive damage in Moapa and Overton, and even though the local media, flood 
control personnel, and officials for years attributed flood damage to poor engineering and 
developers continually ignoring building codes, this thesis argues that the building 
standards the cities and county attempted to enforce were ineffective and never addressed 
the fundamental issues of storm water conveyance and its effect on the surrounding built 
environment. 
 After voters rejected the1962 bonding initiative to fund a regional flood control 
district, county commissioners established a flood water management division within the 
public works department. In 1979 the small division had two people reviewing and 
approving all drainage studies for the entire county. In the mid-1970s Lou Vita retired 
from the Los Angeles Water District and moved to Las Vegas to escape the growing 
congestion of Southern California. In 1979, Vita decided to get a part-time job to pass the 
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time, so he applied for a low-level position in public works. His resume quickly caught 
the attention of the department’s director Floyd Lamb. Impressed by Vita’s experience 
Lamb offered him a full-time position to run the flood water management division. Vita 
was accustomed to large budgets; in the 1970s the Los Angeles Water District was the 
premier water management agency in the West, and arguably in the entire United States. 
He began with no staff, so realized that he faced a virtually impossible task of managing 
the county’s flood control problems.80 
 Following the 1981 floods in Moapa, residents near the Cooper Avenue crossing 
sued Clark County, claiming the bridge and drainage pipes over the dry river bed of the 
Muddy River were inadequate to handle stormwater and debris. Prior to the bridge’s 
construction, most rain storms would have produced enough water to wash out Cooper 
Avenue where the road dipped into the Muddy River wash, cutting off half the town. 
Ironically, in late 1980 Floyd Lamb had sent the newly-hired Vita to evaluate various 
drainage systems and flood-prone areas his department classified as “hot-spots” that 
required immediate attention. The Cooper Avenue crossing was one of the most urgent. 
During the first deposition of the 1981 lawsuits, attorney Mike Mansfield called Vita as 
an expert witness for the defense. He asked Vita to assess the Cooper Avenue crossing. In 
a 2010 interview, Mansfield jokingly recalled the horror that he felt when Vita answered: 
“Oh my (explicative)! How could they have built such a thing?”81 Later it would be 
revealed that the county’s engineers had designed an all-weather crossing with two large 
drainage pipes to be installed and then the road built over top. However, the project lost 
funding, but Lamb knew the road needed improvement. So, county public works crews 
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constructed a smaller system that was primarily used when water was constantly present. 
At the Cooper Avenue crossing, construction crews guessed what the expected flow 
direction would be and angled the small culverts accordingly. But when later flood waters 
combined with the massive debris field hit the angled culver it instantly clogged and 
flooded nearly all the homes in the area.82  
 Clark County was later found liable for the damages caused in the Cooper Avenue 
crossing flood. A growing number of lawsuits against the county and other municipalities 
were being processed in district court as a result of the local public works departments 
installing less expensive and less adequate flood control facilities to save on cost. Even 
though many of the lawsuits were settled out of court, the practice of stretching flood 
control dollars for decades was finally coming back to haunt the entire metro area. With 
more urgent concerns facing western cities in the 1960s and 1970s, such as traffic, crime, 
growth and water, skimping on flood control was a common practice. In Clark County, 
planners and developers continued to use urban streets for channeling stormwater to 
avoid building concrete lined conveyance channels. With no sustainable funding source, 
local engineers and officials during this period did their best to control localized flooding. 
Unfortunately, the solutions they were proposing and approving for construction were 
inadequate, and in most instances caused even more damage during heavy rain-storms. 
 By 1981 the flood water management division required developers to prove their 
projects were safe from flooding by submitting engineering studies and verbally 
confirming that measures were in place to ensure that downstream properties were safe 
from exiting stormwater. However, the drainage study that engineers routinely submitted 
to Vita’s office was only a single-page that answered just three questions: “How much 
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water comes into the development?”, How much water does the development 
contribute?” and “How much water leaves the development.” The current CCRFCD 
drainage design manual is nearly 600-pages.  
Prior to the County of Clark v. Powers case the various building permit 
departments in the metropolitan area would stamp or sign-off that a developer’s engineer 
had submitted a drainage study, which would protect the government entities from any 
liability. Even though defense attorneys argued that the Supreme Court’s opinion was 
vague, Mansfield advised Clark County that merely approving a drainage study or 
signing off on a retaining wall did not indemnify them. It was later revealed that 
developers were getting around code enforcement by simply asking Lou Vita to verbally 
approve revisions to flood control standards. “If the county got sued after a flood,” 
Mansfield noted in 2010, “the developer would turn on Vita, claiming to the judge that it 
was what his office told them to do.” Into the early 1980s the cities and county were 
forced to pay thousands of dollars in damages because their approval policies and 
oversight did not have checks in place to hold unscrupulous developers accountable.83 
Research indicates that the increasing number of flood-related lawsuits in the 
early 1990s became a major driving force to ramp up flood control measures, because 
many residents believed that corrective actions were taking too long to implement. In 
addition, the region was expanding into areas of the desert prone to flooding. However, in 
Clark County from 1977 to 1984 there is no evidence that the lawsuits against the local 
governments influenced progressive-minded officials like County Commissioners Bruce 
Woodbury and Manuel “Manny” Cortez and State Assemblymen Jim McGaughey to 
aggressively pursue the formation of a regional flood control plan. For these individuals it 
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was about quality of life, a quality of life that was endangered during the summer of 
1984. 
On August 15, 1984, Urban Livengood, the liaison between Comprehensive 
Planning and the Public Works Department testified in front of a Clark County 
Commissioners meeting that the cities and county in the past had been waiving flood 
control improvements after developers requested financial relief from the strain of rising 
building costs. The largest complaint from developers during this period was the unfair 
apportionment of flood control cost. In a 2010 interview, Robert Lewis, local land 
developer and former home builder, noted that local governments would use “the law of 
the jungle,” lumping the entire cost of mitigation projects in a specific area on the first 
few builders. Therefore, it was no surprise that developers would skimp on channels and 
drainage pipes to keep their costs down, because they felt that flood codes unfairly 
inflated construction costs and lowered their overall profit margin, which slowed the pace 
of growth.84   
 Growth in the Las Vegas valley was becoming a problem by the early 1980s. Not 
only did more people and a larger area have to be protected, but new developments were 
straining existing flood control facilities. This became apparent to some members in the 
community after the August 10, 1983, storm, which dropped four inches of rain over the 
southwest part of the valley, causing $3 million in damage. Bruce Woodbury attempted 
to use this flood to convince state lawmakers of the need to create a flood control district. 
Most long-time residents knew that it periodically flooded in Southern Nevada – the 
storms hit very hard and very fast, hours later clouds were gone, the sun shined bright, 
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and the community cleaned up the dirt and debris. Unfortunately, 1984 would be a 
watershed year in the history of flooding for the Las Vegas area.85 
 From July to September in 1984 seven massive storms hit central Clark County. 
The public property damage from flooding exceeded $9 million. During this time the Las 
Vegas Review Journal and Las Vegas Sun printed pictures of flooding across the county 
that documented the damaged homes, flooded commercial districts, and loss of life. One 
of the most dramatic images captured, was that of Don Collett, editor of the Las Vegas 
City Magazine and parent, carrying a young North Las Vegas student to safety, through 
knee-high waters, with a school bus on its side in the background (fig 27). 
 
 
Figure 27. Don Collett carrying a North Las Vegas student to safety 
(Las Vegas Review Journal August 15, 1984) 
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President Ronald Reagan declared Clark County a federal disaster area after a series of 
deadly storms in September. The powerful images captured by the media of the battered 
metro area convinced even the most fiscally conservative resident in the valley to vote for 
flood bonds in order to protect local children. During one particular storm on the evening 
of September 10, 1984, a young family of five drowned in the southwest part of the 
valley. This tragedy became the tipping point for Republican State Assemblyman Jim 
McGaughey to pursue a comprehensive flood control solution for Clark County. 
McGaughey should be given most of the credit for being the architect of the district, 
removing flood control from county control, making it independent, and creating a 
Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC) to oversee the politicians and ensure the district’s 
longevity.86 
 During the afternoon of September 10, 1984, Frank Faylor of the National 
Weather Service in Las Vegas reported a massive storm cell gaining strength over the 
Mojave Desert. It was 150 miles long, stretching from Needles, California, across the Las 
Vegas valley and up into Lincoln and Nye County. This storm produced an intense 
isolated cloud burst; at one point during the day officials observed rain falling on one side 
of street in a valley neighborhood while the other side was completely dry. The heaviest 
rains hit the Spring Mountains shortly before nightfall. There were reports of a four-foot 
deep torrent of stormwater flowing along the Blue Diamond Road just east of today’s 
Mountain’s Edge. Around 7:30p.m. Michael Shepard and his wife Carol, who lived in a 
remote desert community one mile south of Blue Diamond Road and seven-miles west of 
I-15, loaded their three children: Shanna, 6; Shad 3; and Shiela, 2 weeks old, into the 
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family truck and ventured out across one of the muddy desert roads near their home. 
Metro police later reported that Shepard attempted to gain access to Blue Diamond Road 
by driving through the rising flood water, when his truck was swept away. The local 
Flight for Life helicopter arrived shortly before 8:00, but came back empty as rescue 
officials pronounced all family members dead at the scene. The shocking news was 
quickly relayed over the local radio stations. Emergency personnel quickly located four 
of the bodies – however, 2-week-old Shiela’s body was not immediately found.87 
 As the storm intensified, Assemblyman McGaughey raced from his home south of 
Blue Diamond Road to assist a group of residents filling sand bags on the banks of the 
Duck Creek Wash near Blue Diamond and the I-15. As the evening went on, updates of 
the drowning continued to broadcast. The search for Sheila intensified late into the night. 
Then around midnight, Ron Flood, who would later become the Clark County Coroner, 
pulled Sheila’s body out of a large sagebrush. In a 2010 interview, McGaughey said he 
was haunted for years of the image of her little body lodged in those bushes. “That baby’s 
drowning was the defining moment,” he proclaimed, “her death gave me the passion to 
solve this [flooding] problem.” By late fall he began reviewing options for a bill to 
submit in the 1985 Nevada State Legislative session.88  
 The 1984 floods also captured the attention of Mrs. M.J. Harvey, a local resident 
living in a neighborhood on the banks of the Duck Creek Wash near the intersection of 
Pecos and Warm Springs just west of the new Green Valley community. Harvey, a 
staunch conservative, became involved with flooding after her neighborhood was hit five 
times during the summer of 1984. “When it would flood,” Harvey noted in 2010, “I 
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would call Bruce Woodbury and he would come out and survey the scene.” By early 
1985 the Republican Woodbury, had gained much credibility with the largely 
conservative local population. He was known for being a strict opponent of tax increases, 
but he recognized that the key to solving the region’s flood threat required hundreds of 
millions of dollars for new projects to correct decades of inadequate, patch-work 
measures. Voters had approved flood control bonds in 1981 and early 1984, which 
yielded $47 million in funds for mitigation projects. However, two problems arose from 
the bond issues: bonds do not generate additional revenue for sustaining decades of 
construction and maintenance and second, developers continued to construct flood 
control across the county that did not link up to downstream projects and channels. In 
effect, structures located in one jurisdiction did not match those constructed in a nearby 
one. In short, effective flood control required coordinated engineering with the channels 
and diameter of pipes widening as the system approached Boulder Highway, through the 
Las Vegas Wash and then off to Lake Mead. To complicate matters further, priority was 
still given to projects based on past disasters, rather than being part of a more 
comprehensive plan to prevent future flooding.89 
The Fathers of Flood Control 
Unlike Woodbury’s 1983 failure to gain support in Carson City for the formation 
of a regional flood control district, by 1985 he had enough political capital to pursue 
regionalizing flood control. While city and county planners were enforcing adequate 
floodplain ordinances and building codes based on the National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP) standards, local public works departments still did not coordinate with one 
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another to ensure channel systems connected across the valley. Despite prodding by 
influential Nevada Resort Association members, local government officials, and private 
developers, the county still lacked a comprehensive regional approach. Flood control 
exposed the Las Vegas metropolitan area’s core problem: lack of regional government.90   
On August 6, 1984, the Clark County Commission working through the Regional 
Transportation Commission (RTC) discussed conducting a valley-wide stormwater 
drainage inventory to evaluate existing problem areas and develop a short-term needs 
survey with cost estimates and funding options. Many different funding sources were 
discussed, but a service charge on home owners had the potential of being flexible to 
generate sufficient money to establish a viable foundation for the proposed program. The 
average property owner would be charged $1.40 per month, which county officials 
estimated would generate $25 million in revenue over a ten-year period. In the 
commissioners’ defense, the actual master plan’s cost of nearly $1 billion would not be 
obvious until late 1985. At this point, Commissioner Manny Cortez and Las Vegas 
Mayor Ron Lurie questioned if the RTC would require legislative changes to become 
legally responsibility for flood control. There was no language in NRS-543, the state’s 
flood control policy, which prohibited the RTC from managing flood control. However, 
by mid-fall the board members dropped the idea in support of a new district controlled by 
the county.91  
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In October members of the RTC unanimously voted to have Clark County ask the 
state legislature for bill to enable the county to draft a ballot question for approval in the 
1986 general election. Many members of the RTC as well as various local authorities 
believed flood control should be managed by the Clark County Commission. Cortez told 
local reporters that local and state oversight officials were unnecessarily complicating the 
procedure which made Clark County the governing head of the proposed flood control 
district. As in the past, officials could not come to a consensus on a funding source; there 
were proponents for property tax, special service fees and even a pro-rated utility fee.92  
  After the summer torrents of 1984, flood control became an election issue, with 
every candidate jumping on the band-wagon. In November 1984 voters in the valley’s 
eastern section elected Jay Bingham, a strong proponent of flood control, to County 
Commission District B. Bingham defeated incumbent Paul May Jr., who had been 
appointed by Governor Richard Bryan in 1983 after Commissioner Jack Petitti was 
indicted for taking bribes in one of Nevada’s biggest public corruption cases.93 Residents 
were tired of politicians like Petitti and May allowing contractors hired to install flood 
control measures taking months and even years to complete projects, which threatened 
major thoroughfares such as Nellis Boulevard. During his campaign Bingham, who was a 
successful valley land developer, saw contractors working for a few days on the roads or 
channels before leaving the site to work on the side for a private developer’s project. 
Since there were no time limits for public projects, the contractor could move crews over 
to the higher-profit private jobs, complete them, and then return to work on flood 
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channels or roads. Bingham is credited with establishing completion dates for all public 
works projects sent out to bid and for accessing fines and penalties on those missing 
deadlines.94 
In late 1984 newly elected State Assemblyman Jim McGaughey seized the 
opportunity to take a comprehensive flood control bill to Carson City. Over the winter he 
assembled a team to draft a bill he could sponsor. The group included Las Vegas City 
Manager Ashley Hall, Irene Porter, who left the City of North Las Vegas’s planning 
department in 1977 to head the Southern Nevada Home Builders Association, and Pat 
Shalmy, the director of the county’s public works department and a future Clark County 
manager. McGaughey saw the importance of reaching across the deep political divide. 
Going against the advice of fellow senior Republican assemblymen, he asked Democratic 
State Assemblyman Danny Thompson, chair of the Government Affairs Committee and 
the president of the Nevada Steelworkers Union, to be his co-sponsor. McGaughey knew 
Thomas was a major proponent of flood control for Clark County and was influential in 
the state’s Democratic house minority. It should be noted that the Democrats controlled 
the state’s assembly in 1981 and 1983 regular legislative sessions, and then the 
Republicans took control in 1985.95    
McGauhey’s team argued that a major differentiating factor of the flood control 
problem versus other pressing problems, such as the need for more firefighters, police 
and schools, was that when floods rushed through the valley, the water ignored political 
boundaries. McGaughey understood that each entity had different flood concerns; and, 
                                                 
94 Jay Bingham, former Clark County Commissioner and head of Las Vegas Convention and Visitor 
Authority, interviewed by author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, NV. April 21, 2010.  
95 Jim McGaughey, former Nevada State Assemblyman (R), interviewed by author, tape recorded, Las 
Vegas, NV., April 15, 2010. Danny Thompson, former Nevada State Assemblyman (D) and current 
Executive Secretary of AFL-CIO, interviewed by author, tape recorded, Henderson, NV., May 11, 2010. 
93 
 
therefore, they never came together to share engineering or funding ideas from the top of 
Mt. Charleston to the Las Vegas Wash. For example, Thompson expressed his dismay 
over a 1980 flood on the western edge of the Henderson city limits, which was caused by 
a county approved flood channel that stopped at the edge of the city’s boundary and was 
pointed directly at a housing subdivision just a few hundred feet downstream.96  
McGaughey noted in 2010 that leading up to his election to the assembly in 1984 
he was shocked by the wasteful spending at both the local and state levels. “They always 
had the tax payer to fall back on.” As a fiscal conservative, he understood the importance 
of designing a bill with a simple but very specific oversight component. By February 
1985 McGaughey was ready to propose a sustainable funding mechanism to influence the 
metropolitan flood control. It consisted of charging a utility fee whose cost to each 
property owner would depend on the amount of water runoff’s effect on that type of  
property. McGaughey’s bill also had two additional components: first it outlined the 
governing board’s structure and then created two advisory committees to oversee the 
projects and funding.97  
To fund the preparation of the region’s master construction plan the legislature 
also approved a two-percent property tax increase in Clark County for one year to raise 
$1.5 million. In late March of 1985, the newly formed Clark County Flood Control 
District selected James M. Montgomery Consulting Engineers, a Salt Lake City-based 
engineering firm, to design the master plan at a cost of $988,000. County commissioners 
recommended that the district begin a search for qualified candidates to fill the position 
of general manager to oversee the program. However, with no permanent funding source 
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in place a new general manager would face job insecurity and no budget to hire staff or 
begin implementing the master plan. The district decided to postpone the search until the 
passage of the bill, but unbeknown to the rest of the county commission and other 
entities, McGaughey, Cortez and Woodbury had their eye on a young local engineer 
named Virginia Bax.98  
As the legislature continued to explore options for Clark County, Assemblyman 
Thomas Hickey (D-North Las Vegas) argued that the Clark County Commission should 
run the flood control district just like the successful Regional Transportation Commission 
(RTC). The RTC had the structure in place and Hickey, along with Bruce Woodbury, 
argued that representatives from the various local governments reporting to the county 
commission could possibly ensure a quicker implementation of the master plan. 
McGaughey countered Hickey’s suggestion with his own blueprint that would become a 
defining moment toward the unification of the governments in Clark County. 
McGaughey proposed to take flood control out of the hands of the county commissioners 
and create an independent regional board to run the district. It would consist of two 
county commissioners, two Las Vegas councilmen, and one official each from Henderson 
and North Las Vegas, Boulder City and Mesquite who would alternate on the board every 
two years. This caused a major stir as commissioners resisted yielding control of the 
district. Commissioners Karen Hayes and Bruce Woodbury believed it was 
unconstitutional and did not account for “the one man, one vote” ruling of the U.S. 
Supreme Court. They argued the City of Las Vegas and Clark County would have equal 
voting power, effectively leaving hundreds of thousands of county residents without 
elected officials. The county commission represented all residents in Clark County, and 
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by limiting the commission to two seats on the district’s board Woodbury and Hayes 
worried that rural residents would be left out.  Research shows that the failure to address 
flood control in Clark County occurred partly because the cities never recognize the 
county’s power. In a February 13, 1985, interview with the Las Vegas Review Journal, 
McGaughey defended his rationale for creating an independent district that was not 
controlled by one jurisdiction: 
My main concern is to make this flood control system operate 
constructively. We have to have representation from every political entity in 
the valley. The reality of the matter is, and this is politics, if one entity is in 
charge of something, the other political entities next door will feel left out 
and won’t give their total support and commitment, and I want to get rid of 
that problem.99 
 
McGaughey’s bill created a level playing field, which this thesis argues helped curtail 
decades of infighting among jurisdictions and, more importantly, curbed fears of one 
local government subordinating its powers to another.100 
 The bill’s last component created a two-tier oversight structure. First, McGaughey 
called for all local public works directors to sit on a Technical Advisory Committee 
(TAC). Working with the district’s engineers, the TAC would be charged with proposing 
projects. Shortly after first general manager of the flood control district was hired, the 
TAC members would develop a list of their top projects and prioritize them in an effort to 
reassure residents that all parts of the metro area would receive equal attention. By 
creating a technical board, the problem could be solved by treating the metropolitan area 
as a whole, without concern for jurisdictional boundaries.  
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The second board consisted of private residents from each of the entities in the 
valley, and they would be appointed to the Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC). The 
CAC mirrored the flood control district’s board. The citizens were charged with 
monitoring the politicians’ actions and use of funds. McGaughey believed citizens should 
run the government, and he knew from his years in construction, the build out of a 
massive flood control system would take decades. By having a permanent advisory 
committee written into law and with members solely dedicated to flood control, there was 
less likelihood of future government officials shelving the district. The CAC would 
become important in 1986, when Bruce Woodbury, McGaughey, and other officials 
began a public relations tour of Clark County to sell the final funding mechanism to 
residents.101  
On June 2, 1985, Governor Richard Bryan signed Assembly Bill 169 (AB 169) 
into law. It established the RTC as the Board of Directors for the district, which achieved 
McGaughey’s goal of creating an independent district. The bill made substantial technical 
and policy changes to the 1955 Nevada Revised Statute 543 (NRS 543), which had 
created a state flood control policy. AB 169 also granted additional powers to the Clark 
County Flood Control District to hire a staff of engineers and various other flood control 
specialists to create uniform standards and assist in land use oversight.102 
AB169 did not specify the funding mechanism that would be used to pay for the 
estimated $200 million in flood control needs for Clark County, but it required the new 
district to have a funding source in place by the fall to ensure the question could be on the 
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1986 election ballot. So the district’s board moved quickly, holding its first meeting on 
July 11, 1985, electing Clark County Commissioner Bruce Woodbury as the first chair, a 
position he held until 1990.103 The board immediately approved the funding of a 
$380,000 federal study of flood detention measures on the eight major washes in the Las 
Vegas valley. A national search for a general manager began the following day.104  
AB169’s most important component was that it authorized the district to hire a 
chief engineer and general manager. Employing a qualified engineer to manage the 
district was a major contributing factor to the district’s success through the 1990s and 
into present day. Shortly after the bill was passed, McGaughey and Cortez set out to get a 
qualified general manager. In 2010 McGaughey recalled hearing about a young woman 
engineer working for Black & Veatch in Las Vegas. Prior to the creation of the district, 
Virginia Bax had been working with the Clark County Public Works Department to 
design a set of detention basins on the edge of the Red Rock Canyon just west of the 
present-day 215 beltway and Charleston Boulevard, as well as a basin in the canyons 
feeding the Upper Flamingo wash southwest of Las Vegas. At the time Marty Manning, 
the county’s public works director was considered a leading candidate for the position. 
But McGaughey considered Manning a political insider and worried that Manning’s 
allegiance to one entity or another could be a liability, and his concerns hurt Manning’s 
chances, but Bax was a woman, and women had not made it through the “glass ceiling” 
in a lot of corporate and government entities in Southern Nevada. To be sure, many local 
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officials wanted a man to manage the district. But Bax was smart and capable and 
McGaughey prevailed. So, on January 31, 1986, the Clark County Flood Control District 
board unanimously Bax as the first chief engineer and general manager of the district. 
With a salary ranging between $55-$65,000 per year, she became the highest-paid female 
government employee in the county’s history.105 
 Once Bax was hired, the district could focus on holding public hearings and 
approving a sustainable funding mechanism. In early February board members rejected 
McGaughey’s proposal to fund the district through a property tax. Instead, Woodbury and 
other members of the board recommended that a one-quarter of a cent sales tax increase 
be the funding source put on the 1986 general election ballot. As Woodbury explained at 
a public hearing on January 31, 1986, “The property tax has been overworked. Sales tax 
is much less of a burden of the overage citizen. We’re already paying 6 cents on many 
dollars spent because the [five and three-quarter] tax is being round off.”106 In 1986, only 
seven-percent of all property in Clark County was privately owned, but nearly 30 percent 
of the local sales taxes were paid by tourists. In an effort to show the residents that flood 
control was moving beyond decades of infighting, on March 3, 1986, board members 
changed the name of the Clark County Flood Control District to the Clark County 
Regional Flood Control District. Then on April 24th the CCRFCD officials released a 
master plan draft that outlined a forty-year construction schedule. At an estimated cost of 
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$835 million, the master plan was a ground-breaking program to correct decades of 
mistakes while ensuring that future development would be protected (fig 37).107   
 By late spring of 1986 the stage was set to tackle the most important task in 
finalizing the comprehensive regional flood control plan: convincing Clark County voters 
to approve a permanent tax increase for the sole purpose of protecting the metropolitan 
area from stormwater. Proponents of the sales tax increase feared a repeat of the failed 
1962 bond election, so from May 1986 through the primary election on September 2nd a 
small band of dedicated government officials, concerned citizens, and business people led 
by Bruce Woodbury, Jim McGaughey and Virginia Bax, convinced residents to vote for a 
sales tax increase that benefited present and future residents of Clark County. Few people 
understood at the time that the vote was a “now or never” opportunity to move away from 
decades of relying on federal handouts and to take local responsibility for funding 
regional flood control.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
1986-1990 
 
“Floods don’t stop at a stop-sign or a city-limit; they just rage.  
We had that in our favor.”108 
 
Figure 28. Martin Luther King Blvd and Pinto Lane, August 18, 1989 
(Photo credit to Las Vegas Sun) 
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The Now-or-Never Vote 
 During the winter of 1985-86, the CCRFCD and Southern Nevada legislators 
joined forces to map out a campaign strategy to persuade voters in September 1986 to 
increase Clark County’s sales taxes by one-quarter of one-percent. Bruce Woodbury gave 
Judy Brailsford the responsibility of forming a citizens committee to convince the 
community about the need for adequate flood control. At the time, Brailsford was 
running his political campaigns, so in late 1985 she became the public outreach 
coordinator for the Citizens for Flood Protection (CFP) campaign. It was her job to 
organize the committee, create a speaker’s bureau and get the politicians, flood control 
officials and the citizens committee in front of as many Clark County as possible before 
the election.109  
 Brailsford modeled the citizens committee after blue ribbon committees, 
traditionally comprised of outstanding citizens in a community who were brought 
together to study a complex issue and to publicly endorse a solution. Brailsford believed 
that if the CCRFCD lacked a convincing argument for safeguarding the community and 
its children, the tax increase would be doomed to failure. Jim McGaughey recommended 
Ann Zorn, the district’s CAC chair, to also lead the Citizens for Flood Protection and to 
be part of the speaker’s bureau. Zorn headed the Southern Nevada League of Women 
Voters chapter and her husband, Roman J. Zorn had been UNLV’s president from 1969-
73. McGaughey considered her a pragmatic, nonpartisan problem-solver who would 
focus on the issues and not get sidetracked. For his part, the Republican Woodbury called 
upon M.J. Harvey, who had become an outspoken activist for flood control after the 
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massive floods of 1983 and 1984 nearly destroyed her community. Brailsford and 
McGaughey believed that Zorn, a Democrat, and Harvey, a Republican, would show the 
community that flood control transcended politics. “This was an issue,” Brailsford stated 
in a 2010 interview, “that had no political or geographic boarders -- floods don’t stop at 
stop signs or a city-limit; they just rage.” The group knew it had the community’s 
universal concern about flooding in its favor.110  
Woodbury felt that government officials seeking re-election in 1986 needed to 
make flood control part of their campaign, so he asked fellow county commissioners 
Manny Cortez and Thalia Dondero, City of Las Vegas Mayor Ron Lurie, and Las Vegas 
Commissioner Al Levy to participate in the speaker’s bureau. By August 1986, 
Woodbury and the CFP had received over fifty endorsements for their campaign from all 
the major local media outlets, both political parties, every local government commission, 
and numerous civic and organizations.111 
 Woodbury headed up the grass-roots campaign and Bax covered the design 
portion, while Harvey and Zorn were vital to giving the presentations a personal touch. 
Over a period of nine months, Brailsford set up 162 meetings across Clark County. They 
were so passionate about flood control that they spoke to any meeting of citizens of two 
or more. In a 2010 interview, Bax (now Virginia Valentine) remembered one presentation 
at a mobile home park on the valley’s east side where they spoke in front of an audience 
composed of “one guy in flip-flops.” The presentations were 20-30 minutes long; they 
began with photo slides dating as far back as the 1906 and 1910 floods in Meadow 
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Valley, to show the region’s historic vulnerability to flooding. Woodbury would discuss 
why the community needed comprehensive flood control; Bax then covered the Master 
Plan; Harvey and Zorn then emphasized how flooding affected every valley resident; and 
McGaughey closed by urging the audience to please vote for the quarter-cent sales tax.112  
 Every time he mentioned the tax increase Woodbury, Brailsford and the other 
politicians would cringe. McGaughey defended this approach because he believed that 
presenting the residents with a reasonable flood control plan and how it would be funded 
would lead to more voter support on Election Day. During this same time, fiscal 
conservatives across the state were paying close attention to California’s Question 13, 
which, if passed, would have stopped all new tax increases. Woodbury made a simple but 
effective argument against those pushing a similar proposal in Nevada. He knew that 
Clark County’s sales tax would eventually rise, following the lead of Washoe and Nye 
County sales tax increases. He believed the extra revenue should go to flood control, 
which 96 percent of surveyed county residents believed was needed. In his presentation, 
Woodbury stressed the importance of putting it toward flood control rather than letting 
some other agency get the dollars. He told reporters that “merchants favor the increase 
because it’s easier to figure out, and people have the perception they’re paying 6 percent 
anyway.”113  
 To ensure the highest quality media campaign, Woodbury called upon his long 
time political strategist, Kent Orem, to produce the advertisements. Orem brought much 
experience to Woodbury’s team. He had been running campaigns since the early 1970s, 
and by the mid-1980s, was considered by many local politicians an expert in building 
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advertising campaigns for tax increase initiatives. During the late 1970s and early 1980s 
his company, OIZ Advertising conducted numerous local and regional polls which 
uncovered a disturbing trend about voters in the American Southwest. Its data revealed 
that the more time passed between events such as the 1984 floods and the 1986 election 
to combat them, the more likely the tax or bond measure would fail. In Orem’s opinion, 
local voters had to see the flood devastation near Election Day. Recognizing that 1986 
might not witness the same intense storms and devastation as 1983 and 1984, he advised 
Woodbury and Brailsford to constantly remind the community, with pictures and video of 
the devastation.114  
Later in the spring of 1986 Brailsford and Orem’s team created a political action 
committee (PAC) to raise money, which they named after the Citizens for Flood 
Protection committee. Since Bax and her staff were county employees, Woodbury 
chaired the PAC. In less than a month, it raised nearly $100,000 for a late summer media 
blitz across Clark County. OIZ Advertising designed print ads, recorded radio spots, and 
produced television commercials complete with images and footage from past floods. 
Leading up to the September election, local television stations ran several commercials. 
One in particular featured Woodbury in Overton, knee-deep in mud and water, filling 
sandbags on the banks of a swelling wash. Another showed long-time local reporter Fred 
Lewis covering earlier floods across Southern Nevada. Orem even pulled images from 
the 1975 Caesars Palace flood to remind residents that floods also threatened the vital 
tourism industry, the lifeblood of the local economy. The flood control funding campaign 
was so successful that over the next three decades Orem and OIZ Advertising worked 
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with other politicians and government agencies to secure funding approval for their local 
and state-wide initiatives.115 
Predictably, the only opposition to the sales tax increase came from Carol Vilardo 
and Everett Perlberg of the Nevada Taxpayers Association. During the final negotiations 
for AB169 in 1985, Vilardo and Perlberg raised their concerns about McGaughey’s 
funding mechanism lacking a “sunset” clause. Vilardo argued that residents would not 
have the opportunity to roll back the tax increase, and Perlberg wanted to know: “How do 
you get the population to exercise veto rights?” Woodbury responded that a formal date 
to remove the tax increase might threaten federal matching funds the Army Corps of 
Engineers had earmarked for Southern Nevada once the sales tax increase passed. After 
the voters approved the tax increase in September and with great confidence that the 
federal matching funds would be secured, Woodbury and Brailsford convinced 
McGaughey to allow Vilardo and Perlberg to push through AB-115, which put language 
in the flood control legislation to allow a ten-year “sunset” clause. In Woodbury’s 
opinion, by 1995 the master construction plan would be one-third complete, making it 
virtually impossible to stop the program’s positive impact on the community. In 1987, 
AB115 amended AB169 with the proper wording for a proposed public review and vote 
in 1995. Nevertheless, during the summer of 1986 some members of the CFP still feared 
that the funding request would not pass. In 2010, Brailsford recalled worrying that voters 
would reject the ballot question even with all the endorsements, public support, and the 
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well-funded media campaign, leaving no alternative to solve the problem. Even 
McGaughey warned Woodbury and the CFP that this was a “now or nothing vote.”116  
Although support from the community continued to increase, as the mild spring 
weather began to show signs of the coming summer heat and the possibility of more 
floods, proponents of the measure were torn between hoping for heavy rains to soak the 
valley and fearing that another summer of deadly storms would bring more death and 
destruction. The year 1985 was the first in a quarter century when no one was killed in a 
Clark County flood. From a political standpoint there was growing concern that without a 
major flood in 1986, voters might not consider flooding enough of a threat to justify 
raising taxes. One Las Vegas Sun reporter wrote in June that “everybody talks about the 
weather, but nobody’s willing to do anything about it.”117 A common joke in the 
community was that “Southern Nevada only gets seven inches of rain a year, but it gets it 
all in one day.” Past funding measures had failed because, as Governor Richard Bryan 
told the Las Vegas Sun in 1984, valley residents were always guilty of “sunny day 
voting” on flood control.118 The 1962 bond election was held in April, two months prior 
to the region’s flood season. Later research concluded that many local residents viewed 
the 1955 flood as an anomaly and assumed the valley would never experience stormwater 
of the magnitude again, because it had not flooded in the metropolitan area since 1955. 
But this proved to be wishful thinking, a reaction that flood control proponents hoped 
would not delude voters again.119 
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McGaughey and Woodbury also understood that phrasing a ballot question was 
equally important as important as the campaign message. “The attitude of a lot of voters,” 
McGaughey told a reporter in July 1986, “is when in doubt, vote no.”120 Local officials 
agreed that the wrong wording could make it appear as if the county was creating a new 
tax, rather than raising the sales tax a quarter-cent. More importantly, Woodbury 
recognized that some residents had short memories about flooding, so the vote, in 
McGaughey’s opinion, had to be as close to the flood season as possible. A local survey 
of valley residents in 1984 asked respondents to rank the major issues facing the 
community; they listed flooding as the number-one threat. The same survey was 
conducted in early 1986, but flooding did not make the top-twenty. To make matters 
worse, Assemblyman Marvin Sedway (Democrat – Las Vegas) warned McGaughey and 
Woodbury that if floods hit again with no structures in place to lessen the damage, the 
cities and county needed to understand that the state lacked the funds to bail them out.121  
So McGaughey included unusual language in AB169 that required voter approval 
of the district’s final funding proposal during the primary election in September 1986. 
Traditionally, all funding requests were put on the November general election ballot. But 
McGaughey wanted to ensure that residents voted on the funding measure during the 
flood season. In addition, he did not want to compete with other funding questions, 
because there was a concern that voters might see multiple requests for money on the 
ballot and vote for another proposal, or maybe none at all. “If I’m the Lone Ranger,” he 
recalled in 2010, “then I’ve got a shot.”122 
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 In what would become a very important component of the later flood control 
system, the City of North Las Vegas, using funds from the 1981 flood control bond sale, 
had completed a $2.9 million detention basin in early 1984. Thanks to the project during 
the devastating storms of 1984 the areas south of the basin had been protected from the 
deadly floods, a fact touted by Woodbury and the others during the 1986 campaign. 
Indeed, the impact of the new detention basin on the quality of life downstream from its 
protective barrier resonated across the valley and encouraged Woodbury and the CFP to 
push forward. By late 1985 the CCRFCD had already prioritized ten projects similar to 
the North Las Vegas basin, and they all were ready to start construction once the tax 
revenues began to flow in by mid-1987. The North Las Vegas basin became a poster-
child for the regional master plan, because the plan represented a major leap forward in 
the flood control fight. For the first time in eighty years, the community had a pro-active 
solution to flood threats across all municipal boundaries that would use federal matching 
funds.123 
 The Nevada Department of Taxation calculated that the one-quarter of one 
percent sales tax increase would generate roughly $1 million per month for the district. 
Shortly after Montgomery Engineers completed the design of the Master Plan, the 
CCRFCD announced its estimated construction cost. At the National Association of 
Counties conference in Las Vegas, Woodbury, Bax and Zorn unveiled the ambitious 
build-out schedule for flood control channels and detention basins. They told delegates 
from all over America that the first phase would take 10-20 years to complete at an 
estimated cost of $389 million. Once the current “patch work” system was corrected and 
the developed lands that were prone to flooding had been protected, then Phase Two 
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would begin. Officials estimated that this phase would cost $447 million and take two 
decades to complete.124 
 The July meeting of the National Association of Counties was the first time 
Woodbury’s team provided the public with cost estimates and projected time-lines. Prior 
to Montgomery’s recommendations, officials had speculated the first phase would only 
cost taxpayers $200 million. Woodbury, Orem and Brailsford knew it would had been 
political suicide if the real projected cost of the Master Plan was revealed. In a 2010 
interview, Brailsford explained that no one in the campaign ever mentioned “billions” 
during their meetings, because there had never been a public works project in the 
Southwest with a price tag exceeding a billion dollars.125 It can be concluded that 
officials close to the project knew the cost was going to be in the billions, so they made a 
conscious decision to lower their public projections. Orem and Brailsford conducted 
opinion polls prior to the formal announcement of the cost. The overwhelming consensus 
from respondents was that even with federal matching funds if the plan’s estimated cost 
came in above a billion dollars it would be defeated (as of 2009 the Master Plan was 20 
years old, with a price tag of $1.3 billion and 30 years remaining until phase two would 
be completed). It is important to note that when the district began building projects in the 
late 1980s the cost per mile of channel was $2 million. At the peak of the local building 
boom in 2007, costs per mile of channel reached $10 million. In early 2011, the cost per 
mile dropped to $7 million.126  
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While the Master Plan seemed near perfect on the surface, out-of-state delegates 
from the National Association of Counties could not comprehend how local officials 
could persuade residents living uphill from the heavy flood risk areas to vote for the sales 
tax increase. Woodbury merely responded that “It would take skillful political 
campaigning.” As Woodbury, Bax, McGaughey, Zorn and Harvey told voters in 1986, 
flooding affected everyone. When fire trucks, police cars, and ambulances could not enter 
an area because roads were under several feet of water, it threatened the quality of 
everyone’s life. Since the 1975 Caesars Palace flood, the Las Vegas tourism industry, 
Southern Nevada’s primary industry and largest employer, saw a significant number of 
cancelled hotel reservations following every major rain storm. Zorn felt the primary 
reason why the measure would pass was that this was a pocketbook issue. The state and 
federal government would not, and probably could no longer afford to fund flood disaster 
clean-up in Clark County. Also, without a comprehensive plan and regional board to 
oversee building code compliance and enforcement of new construction it would have 
been virtually impossible for the community to qualify for FEMA’s National Flood 
Insurance Program. This exposed the entire valley to major financial hardship if another 
season of flooding like 1984 were to occur. So, fearful of losing their homes and 
businesses, Clark County residents went to the polls on September 2, 1986 and 
overwhelmingly approved, by a 2-1 margin, the one-quarter of one percent sales tax 
increase.127     
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Unification of Clark County  
 On September 3, 1986, a delighted and obviously relieved Woodbury and Bax-
Valentine (she got married during the summer campaign), told local media outlets that 
their top priorities were to announce the first ten construction projects and request 
McGaughey and fellow assemblyman, Danny Thompson, to move the tax collection up 
from March 1, 1987 to January 1, 1987, which would give the CCRFCD and extra $2 
million in funds. Shortly after the vote, local planning departments recognized that the 
district would have to work with the cities and county to adopt ordinances requiring all 
developers to follow the same building standards in flood plains. This added 
responsibility would help guarantee that future building across the valley’s open desert 
would follow uniform standards that conformed to the flood control system’s standards. 
For example, the cities and county each required that builders reserve space for flood 
control structures within their planned subdivisions. Some of these bisected streets and 
even ran through blocks and between homes. In all situations, the CCRFCD and its needs 
became paramount.128  
By October 1986, McGaughey’s plan to eliminate corruption in the building 
permit departments and tighten enforcement began to unfold. Everett Perlberg of the 
Nevada Taxpayers Association submitted a recommendation to the Legislative 
Commission, suggesting that the district’s Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), made 
up of local public works staff and directors, have the final say over whether developers 
could obtain flood control variances for their projects. Leading up to the September vote, 
a common resident question of officials was: “Why do permit departments let developers 
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build in the washes?”129  By removing the elected officials from the variance process, this 
virtually illuminated the chance of corruption. Gone were the days of developers greasing 
the pockets of elected officials or getting verbal approvals to cut corners on flood control. 
With the TAC board staffed with engineers from each jurisdiction in Clark County, a 
developer could no longer undermine the process. Woodbury himself objected to the 
TAC having veto power over the district’s board, which was made up of elected officials. 
It can only be assumed that Woodbury, who never had any ethics issues in his 28-year 
career, objected to the TAC having veto rights because by law it was the elected officials’ 
responsibility to decide if a construction variance would be in the community’s best 
interest. Over the past twent-five years, the district has only approved two or three Master 
Plan variances.  
During the same Legislative Commission meeting, Perlberg also requested that a 
cap be put on how much money could be spent on the district’s administration. The 
Nevada Taxpayers Association wanted the costs limited to 15 percent. McGaughey had 
always wanted the district’s staff to remain small in order to keep administrative costs 
low. This would ensure that more miles of channel and basins could be built. Historically, 
CCRFCD has kept its annual operations expenses (salaries, engineering studies, etc.) at 
less than 10 percent of sales tax revenues. The district does not manage the construction 
of flood control projects; that responsibility falls on developers of new land and the 
jurisdictions in which the projects are located. CCRFCD prioritizes projects, updates the 
Master Plan every five years, and allocates funds to the various jurisdictions in Clark 
County. It has been vital for the district to streamline its overhead to maximize every 
dollar for construction. Compared to other special service districts such as the Las Vegas 
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Metropolitan Police Department, Regional Transportation Committee (RTC), Clark 
County School District, Clark County Library District and the Southern Nevada Water 
Authority, the administrative cost versus money for projects makes CCRFCD the most 
efficient special district in Clark County. 
In addition to McGaughey’s plan to keep the district’s administrative costs low, 
he put specific language into the AB169 mandating that revenue from the one-quarter of 
one percent sales tax could only be used for flood control. During the negotiation process 
in 1985, local public works officials wanted language in the bill to allow funding for 
bridge construction with flood control money -- a debate that has intensified during the 
current economic crisis. McGaughey defeated their request by defining flood control as 
building channels and detention basins. The only time a bridge could be funded by 
CCRFCD was when a flood control project affected an existing bridge or required a 
bridge to span a new channel. By the late 1990s the district began receiving requests for 
funding to cover cosmetic improvements around basins. Because McGaughey’s language 
was so specific about funding guidelines, the district was able to refuse requests for “soft 
issues” like parks, side-walks, lamps or landscaping.130 
 Following the successful passage of AB3 on January 28, 1987, which moved the 
start date of the tax increase from July 1, 1987 up to March 1, 1987, the CCRFCD cleared 
its last political hurdle. On February 13, Virginia Bax-Valentine presented the list of 
projects that the district’s staff and elected officials from all Clark County governmental 
entities had been working on for weeks. For the first time in the valley’s history, the 
area’s historically fragmented governments worked together to coordinated flood control. 
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Clark County and the City of Las Vegas governments never liked each other. In Resort 
City in the Sunbelt, Eugene Moehring argued that this fragmentation had resulted from 
Las Vegas’s historic inability to annex its suburbs.131 In his opinion, casino gambling was 
the culprit. The great Strip resorts repulsed all city attempts to tax their games and annex 
their property. The regionalization of flood control, like the need to coordinate highway 
construction and planning, became a catalyst for all the cities and county to come 
together. The political composition of the independent board required political foes to sit 
down at the same table, get acquainted with other officials and build cooperative 
relationships. Prior to the CCRFCD, except for the Regional Transportation Commission 
there was no formal mechanism in place for representatives from entities to get together 
and solve common problems. Bax-Valentine outlined $135 million in projects that 
covered each of Clark County’s geographic areas: Northern Las Vegas Valley, Central 
Las Vegas, Southwest Las Vegas and the rural communities of Boulder City, Moapa, 
Overton and Mesquite. The first eight years of the construction plan was based on which 
projects would protect the largest number of residents, lives and property. During the 
winter of 1986-87, turf wars began to diminish and a consensus developed to make the 
solution to eighty years of flood threats the priority of all. 132 
Credibility Through Resolve 
 In less than three years, state, county, and city governments pulled together and 
passed legislation allowing Clark County to raise money for flood protection and for an 
education program to inform residents about flood hazards and the district’s ambitious 
eight-year construction schedule. On March 1, 1987, the district began what many flood 
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control officials have estimated to be a fifty-year build out of flood control measures 
designed to protect all the developed land in Clark County and accommodate future 
growth. The district began its initial construction projects in those parts of Clark County, 
Las Vegas, Henderson and North Las Vegas where flood control would protect the lives 
and property of the greatest number of residents (Appendix I).133 However, the patience 
of local residents was tested by the amount of time it took local governments and 
CCRFCD to curb the flood problem after the 1986 vote. Even though the first regional 
flood control project funded by the sales tax increase was awarded to Las Vegas Paving 
Corporation in November 1987, early projects in the eight-year plan Bax-Valentine 
announced were designed to correct decades of mistakes. In addition, projects could only 
be constructed when sales tax revenues were received. This “pay-as-you-go” program 
created major problems for the district planning massive basins to be built in the 1990s. 
In 1990 millions of dollars in flood damage occurred because the two major washes in 
the south part of the valley were delayed two or three years due to the lengthy preparation 
of environmental impact studies. These had to be prepared after federal officials 
designated the desert tortoise as an endangered species. In addition, officials had to revise 
the Master Plan to allow for the explosive growth that beset the valley at century’s end. 
Also, some progress was made in fixing prior mistakes. Unfortunately, there was 
continued loss of life. Despite major advances in flood control mitigation, stormwater 
destroyed property and took lives in the metropolitan area during the early year’s of the 
system’s construction.134 
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 Woodbury, Bax-Valentine, and McGaughey were the driving force to keep the 
Master Plan intact in the late 1980s. But it soon became apparent in 1988 and 1989 that 
constructing the flood control system would be the easiest part for the board, staff and 
supporters of the CCRFCD. McGaughey’s fear about over zealous city public works 
directors attempting to siphon off district funds was vindicated in early 1988 when Las 
Vegas public works director Richard Goecke requested $1 million a mile for road 
improvements near CCRFCD projects. Woodbury and Bax-Valentine had to seek an 
attorney general’s opinion even though AB 169 and subsequent amendments to the bill 
clearly identified the types of projects that could be funded by the revenue from the one-
quarter of one percent sales tax.135 
 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) required the CCRFCD to submit an 
Environmental Assessment (EA), a mandate for all communities receiving federal funds 
for projects that could significantly impact the human environment. In an effort to ensure 
that federal matching funds would not be held up, the district hired Dames & Moore to 
consult on the ten-year Master Plan’s potential impact on residents. Officials expected the 
firm to complete the review and submit a snap-shot of its findings by late 1988. However, 
during the preparation of the EA, CCRFCD officials received notification from EPA that 
the desert tortoise, which had been on the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service’s “Threatened” 
species list since the early 1980s, was being move to an “Endangered” status. Even 
though the district had been working on the EA, the escalation of the desert tortoise’s 
status to an “endangered species” required it to submit a full report of the Master Plan’s 
environmental impact. The district assigned Tim Sutko, the senior hydrologist, to write 
the Environmental Impact Statement (ESI). His team had to address the Fish & Wildlife 
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staff’s mitigation concerns to protect the desert tortoise. Fish & Wildlife required the 
district to install special fences in tortoise habitats, or pay for animal’s the relocation. The 
ESI took almost eighteen months to be approved, which further delayed construction in 
many areas.136 
The ESI added to the construction time-line, and by late 1988 the district was 
ready to begin construction on the Upper Flamingo detention near the present-day 
intersection of Russell Road and Durango Drive, which would prevent the type of 
flooding that caused the massive damage at Caesars Palace in 1975. Without the report 
from the Fish & Wildlife agency, the district could not receive the appropriate right-of-
way grants to construct the basin and channels or the $100 million in federal matching 
funds. Bax-Valentine, therefore, filed an appeal in early 1989 to the Council of 
Environmental Quality (CEQ), a federal board made up of members from the Fish & 
Wildlife Agency, EPA, and Soil and Water Conservation. The district also lobbied Harry 
Reid and other Nevada Congressmen to push for the CEQ to allow the district to move 
forward. In the end, the CEQ made a rare exception to the Endangered Species Act and 
approved the building of basins and channel prior to the final EIS being submitted in the 
early 1990s.137 
Once the CEQ gave the district the go-ahead, local officials requested the $100 
million in federal matching funds and land right-of-ways. The last major federal hurdle 
was overcome in the summer of 1989. Later that year, Woodbury and McGaughey met to 
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discuss the district’s progress. Woodbury knew the district could never fund the 
construction of large detention basins needed on the metropolitan area’s periphery. Under 
AB169, projects had to be built with a “pay-as-you-go” model, which required funds to 
be in place before construction could begin. The five largest basins and the miles of 
down-flow channels planned for the first ten-years of Phase One would take decades to 
fund. Woodbury was also concerned that smaller projects to correct the existing “patch-
work” problems would not be built because money would have to be diverted for larger 
projects. Both men knew this contradicted the district’s mission to spread the 
construction projects fairly across the entire county. With monthly revenues of $1 million 
from the sales tax, Woodbury worried that it would take decades to fund the construction 
of a single detention basin, much less hundreds of miles of conveyance channels needed 
to connect the future system across the valley. 138  
Woodbury, therefore asked McGaughey to consider sponsoring a bill to allow 
Clark County to sell bonds on behalf of the CCRFCD. The bonds would pay for the 
larger construction projects and speed up the time-line. Both men knew that the Army 
Corps of Engineers’ feasibility study and the recommendations for the Tropicana and 
Flamingo washes would be submitted later that year. Moreover, flood control officials 
estimated the construction on these two washes alone would cost in excess of $300 
million, of which the CCRFCD would be responsible for nearly $85 million in matching 
funds. At first, McGaughey had reservations about Woodbury’s bill request. They had 
campaigned together in 1986 for the “pay-as-you-go” system, promising voters no loans 
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or no interest payment.139 McGaughey also feared a large influx of money could 
potentially corrupt the process and sabotage the entire Master Plan. McGaughey spent the 
remainder of 1989 evaluating the progress of the tax revenue and reviewed construction 
cost estimates from contractors. By mid-1990, he agreed with Woodbury that “pay-as-
you-go” would take decades to show any return on the community’s flood control 
investment. Also, he had great faith in Bax-Valentine and the CAC to curtail the potential 
of abuse, ensuring that the tax revenue would go toward future bond payments. So during 
the 1991 legislature, McGaughey successfully sponsored AB455, which allowed the 
CCRFCD to let Clark County sell bonds on the district’s behalf. In October of 1991 the 
county was able to sell $81 million in bonds. As a preventive measure, he also wrote a 
second bill, AB462, to prohibit the district from using flood control money for the 
construction, operation, maintenance, or repair of streets, highways or bridges. The 
language McGaughey added allowed flood control officials and elected officials in the 
1990s and today to successful defend against other agencies’ attempts to siphon off flood 
control general funds for their own projects.140 
From 1986 to 1990, County Commissioner Bruce Woodbury, working with State 
Assemblyman James McGaughey, designed legislation that established the CCRFCD and 
funded its fifty-year effort to protect the Las Vegas metropolitan area from flooding. 
They also secured further legislation giving the district bonding capacity to accelerate its 
construction program. Still, even in 1990, there was no time for self congratulation over 
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their historic achievements. Local floods that year damaged more property and took more 
lives, making it even more urgent to get the system built as quickly as possible. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
1990-2010 
 
“You can keep the water away from the people, 
 or keep the people away from the water.”141 
 
 
 
Figure 29 Las Vegas Middle Branch Channel 
(image courtesy of CCRFCD) 
 
 
 
                                                 
141 Gale Frazier, CCRFCD General Manager. 
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Flood of 1990 
 The summer of 1990 was the worst year for the CCRFCD. First, Bruce Woodbury 
announced he would not run for re-election as chair of the district and would instead 
focus on the Regional Transportation Commission (RTC) to work on a plan to curb grid-
lock across the valley. From 1991 to 2002, the RTC spent millions to re-design the major 
freeway interchanges at Interstate 15 and U.S. 95, commonly called the “Spaghetti 
Bowl.” Woodbury also worked to get the massive Las Vegas beltway (that now bears his 
name) funded and designed. Besides Woodbury’s departure, the district in 1990 also 
suffered from delayed construction projects on the Flamingo and Tropicana Washes, as 
the Army Corps of Engineers awaited approval from Washington D.C. certifying that its 
Environmental Impact Study (EIS) had been accepted. In June and July, two large storms 
hit Las Vegas and Henderson. Fortunately, within the Las Vegas city limits, heavy 
downpours fell over the western section of the city, and the newly constructed Angle 
Park, Gowan and Meadows detention basins captured the stormwaters, protecting homes 
in the fledgling Summerlin master planned community. But in the southwest parts of the 
valley the small number of district facilities already built could not prevent massive 
flooding. Block walls toppled and 6-inch reinforced concrete buckled as flood waters 
raged. Three people died during the storms, and private and commercial property owners 
reported nearly $2 million in damages. The 1990 floods epitomized a problem the district 
would face for nearly fifteen years – having projects prioritized and planned, but not 
constructed when a major storm hit an unprotect section of the valley. During this period, 
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some flood control officials would simply tell critics: “If you can tell me where it is going 
to rain, then we will build the next project.”142 
  During the early afternoon of Sunday, June 10, 1990, a large storm front covered 
the Las Vegas valley. In a matter of a few hours one and a half inches of rain fell. In 
Henderson, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints rushed from 
their worship service to aid neighbors in the Green Valley Country Club community. 
Rapidly rising flood water forced people to sandbag around their homes while also trying 
to keep storm drains from clogging to prevent the water from breaching a retaining wall 
and flooding hundreds of homes. In the excitement, Raymond Kunts, a 19-year-old 
member of the church went missing. Rescue officials speculated that he fell into a 
manhole whose cover had been washed way; the Coroner’s office recovered his body the 
next day about three blocks from where the group had been working.143  
 As usual, people continued to risk their lives by attempting to cross flooded 
washes, drive through standing water and disregard the slick road conditions created by 
the storms. That day, every city and county emergency agency received rescue calls 
about people trapped in flood channels and storm-related motor vehicle accidents. There 
were also fatalities. Misty Alexander, a 25-year-old Henderson resident, drowned on her 
way to work. Needing to get to work in Las Vegas, she could go no further when the 
flood waters began to run over the road at the intersection of Russell Road and Topaz 
Street, east of McCarran International Airport. Eyewitnesses told authorities that 
Alexander drove around other cars stopped and inched into the intersection. As soon as 
her tires entered the rushing water, Alexander’s car was swept down the road. People on 
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the edge of the water later recalled seeing the terror in her eyes. As the car neared a 
natural wash, the traumatized Alexander put her hands on the wheel and just calmly 
placed her head on the steering wheel as if to pray for help. The car tumbled into the 
wash and lodged against a concrete abutment. Rescue workers were helpless against the 
pressure caused by the stormwater rushing at a velocity of 40 miles per hour. The water’s 
force held the doors closed sealing Alexander’s fate. The Clark County Fire Department 
pulled her body from the car fourty minutes later.144 
 One month after her death, Rose Lynn Worcester, a 25 year-old mother of two 
was killed on the evening of Sunday, July 16, 1990. It was Worcester’s third day as a 
coffee shop hostess at Whiskey Pete’s Hotel and Casino. It was her turn in the car-pool 
rotation to drive employees to Whiskey Pete’s 45-miles south of Las Vegas (which is 
now Primm). As her shift ended, a massive thunderstorm producing nearly two and a half 
inches of rain hit the valley. After dropping off the last co-worker on Tropicana west of 
the Strip, Worcester headed north on Arville. When she pulled up to the Flamingo Wash 
in her Honda mini-van the water was running extremely fast and deep. Flood officials 
later determined that at the time of her death, the wash had seven feet of rushing water. A 
tow truck driver returning from service calls pulled up behind Worcester, and reported 
seeing her inching her wheels slowly into the waters. In a matter of seconds the force of 
the water grabbed her van and sent it down Flamingo Wash, past the Rio Hotel and 
Casino, towards Caesars Palace and the Strip. The following morning a limousine driver 
discovered her body in the first floor parking lot of the Imperial Palace.145    
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 What made these deaths so tragic was the fact they were preventable. Still, flood 
control and local officials faced a public backlash over the deaths of Worcester and 
Alexander. Attorney Mike Mansfield, represented the CCRFCD on the Worcester case, 
but he decided to settle out of court even though authorities ruled that the though cause of 
death was negligence on Worchester’s part. He convinced the district to give each of her 
two sons $10,000, which was highest amount that could be paid out with no additional 
finance committee approvals. Mansfield feared that if the district or Clark County took it 
to trial, they might lose because of public sympathy for the victims. In 1991, various 
attorneys for Clark County advised officials to settle out of court on twenty-six flood 
damage claims resulting from the June and July floods of 1990. Clark County, which was 
self-insured, settled for $615,873.146 
In the weeks following Alexander’s death, public outcry over the area’s 
continuing lack of flood protection proved hard for officials to address. Ironically, in the 
area where Alexander drowned the district planned to install a new underground system 
in early 1991 to prevent stormwater from flowing over the channels walls. Even though 
many residents in the affected areas viewed this as a constructive solution, for many it 
was “just a day late and a dollar short like flood control always was.”147 During this 
period, Urban Livengood, Clark County’s deputy director of public works, expressed his 
concern over people not respecting the posted warnings and driving through flooded 
streets. Some residents expressed frustration over the slow progress of flood control, and 
there was a growing perception that past flood control projects were now “man-made 
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death traps.”148 In a statement by Livengood after Alexander’s death, which would be 
echoed by flood control officials following every major flood over the next fifteen years, 
“We’re putting in a storm-drain system that will collect this water.” More importantly, 
this statement acknowledged how the negative legacy of the 1960s, 1970s and early 
1980s substandard mitigation, ignorance and neglect of flood hazards continued to haunt 
the rapidly expanding metropolitan area.149 
Through the early 1990s, flood control officials, local planning departments and 
building inspectors faced the difficult task of trying to enforce stricter building codes 
lined out by the NFIP and adopted by the local municipalities in the late 1970s. In 1991, 
Virginia Bax-Valentine told the Las Vegas Review Journal: “One source of problems we 
know about is something gets approved and then it is not built the way it was planned.”150 
It became apparent to flood control officials that the building department’s inability to 
close the permit process’ approval and inspection loop jeopardized the entire regional 
system. For example, the City of Las Vegas did not employ a full-time inspection staff 
during this period. Following the 1990 floods a local reporter discovered that the city’s 
quality control people had been allowing private developers and their engineering firms 
to hire a quality control firm of their choice to supervise the sub-contractors’ installation 
of flood control measures, while the city staff only performed spot checks.151  
In other instances, bureaucratic inefficiencies caused the problems. During a 1991 
government records audit, Richard French, a hydrologist for the Las Vegas-based Desert 
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Research Institute, uncovered numerous instances of one department rejecting a project’s 
drainage study while another department, not adequately verifying the “paper trail,” 
issued building permits. Brent Leavitt, an attorney for hundreds of flood victims during 
the 1980s and 1990s, told reporters in August of 1991 that the valley’s rapid growth, 
coupled with the continued flood damage, caused by new development proved that 
understaffed planning departments were failing to properly evaluate developers’ drainage 
studies. Fortunately for the local agencies, by the mid-1990s communication between 
departments had improved, and through better computer systems and increased usage, 
more accurate records were being kept. Even though it flooded every year in 1990s and 
eleven people lost their lives, local public works departments made great strides in 
correcting past “patch-work” mistakes while also completing numerous new projects 
designed to implement the Master Plan.152 
Building Out the Master Plan 
 As construction increased in early 1992, larger projects and longer sections of 
channels were built, thanks to the $80 million from the 1991 bond issue. During that 
fiscal year the district released $47.6 million in new projects with no additional tax 
burden levied on the community. In accordance with AB 455, the $15 million collected 
from 1992 sales tax revenue went toward bond payments. Also in 1992, Bax-Valentine 
testified before the Army Corps of Engineers in support of authorizing the $4 million pre-
construction engineering and design of the Tropicana and Flamingo Wash Project. 
Construction began on the two washes in 1995 and ended in 2009.153  
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Another significant advance in flood protection came when the district ramped up 
its early warning system. By 1992 the district monitored 56 stations in and around the 
metro area, collecting rainfall data and stream flows. Engineers installed the system after 
the 1974 Nelson Landing flood, 50 miles south of Las Vegas which killed five people. 
Prior to this early warning system, local flood control engineers relied on the National 
Weather Service to predict flooding along Colorado River and the smaller Virgin River. 
However, across the expansive and sparsely populated Mojave Desert, rain gauges were 
necessary to capture and alert local and state agencies of the possibility of flooding 
during high intensity, localized thunderstorms. By 2011 the district’s early warning 
system consisted of 170 gauges throughout Clark County, 80 percent located within the 
Las Vegas valley. 
Also in 1992, flood control officials revisited the possibility of using detention 
basins for dual purposes. This idea dated back to 1985, prior to the district’s formation, 
when officials from Clark County, Las Vegas and North Las Vegas toured a flood control 
playground in Scottsdale, Arizona, built as part of the region’s flood control system. They 
were impressed by the use of park-lined floodways rather than concrete ditches to direct 
stormwater flows. Unfortunately for Clark County, the Phoenix metropolitan area built 
the Indian Bend Greenbelt Floodway using federal subsidies set aside in the early 1970s 
for an Army Corps of Engineers’ recreation program. The federally-funded programs 
dried up during President Jimmy Carter’s administration. In addition, given the unique 
nature of the Las Vegas valley, it would have been difficult to incorporate a system of 
greenbelts on the metro area’s periphery and concrete-lined channels in the urban core, 
because with a sharp drop in elevation from the mountains down to the Las Vegas Wash 
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the green belts would not have been able to slow flood waters sufficiently before they 
entered the channels. Also, the potential damage to the parks and greenbelt would have 
made it cost prohibitive to repair the system after a massive flood event.154 
Later that year, Dundee Jones, the City of Henderson Parks and Recreation 
director, received the “go-ahead” from the Henderson City Council to draft plans for a 
60-acre sports complex, part of which would be in a flood basin in the Pittman Wash. 
Facility architects designed the mesh backstops with hinges, so they could open them up 
to let water flow through. The fields were located on the high ground of the basin to 
ensure people could safely escape if substantial flood waters entered the basin. Funding 
for the project came from a $1.5 million 1988 bond issue, earmarked for developing 
recreation areas, which meant flood control funds would not be used for the complex. 
This ushered in a dual-use program for hundreds of acres of valuable land that required 
flood control officials to construct detention basins throughout the metropolitan area. 
Presently, a large portion of the sports complexes, such as baseball, softball and soccer 
fields are built in flood control facilities. All recreation projects are funded by the local 
entity, and no Flood Control District funds are used to build or maintain them.  
In December 2001, the district adopted policies for dual-use to address the 
difference between channels, detention basins and natural washes. By the early 2000s, 
funding from the Southern Nevada Public Lands Management Act (SNPLMA), which 
came from a portion of the sale of Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands across 
Clark County, gave local entities millions of dollars to design and build parks and 
greenways across the valley. In addition, the valley’s rapid growth during this period put 
pressure on builders and local officials to provide residents with sufficient open public 
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space. Detention basins make great dual-use facilities; however, the district prohibits 
recreational facilities in channels or natural washes because in the Las Vegas valley 
stormwater can raise seven-feet in eight minutes.155  
 
Figure 30. Lone Mountain Detention Basin 
(image courtesy of CCRFCD) 
 
Over time, the CCRFCD lost some of its top leadership. Virginia Bax-Valentine left in 
August 1993 to return to the private sector. Gale Frazier, the assistant general manager 
took over as interim general manager before the CCRFCD board appointed him as the 
district’s general manager, a position he still holds today. During his tenure at the district 
Frazier has been considered by many current and former politicians, developers, and 
flood control proponents to be the driving force behind the district’s success. Irene Porter, 
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the executive director for the Southern Nevada Home Builders Association, noted in a 
2010 interview that “Frazier is an engineer set on one thing, which has been doing the 
best job he can do to provide and build a real flood control system.”156   
The Waiting Game for Land Was Now Over  
While the Indian Bend project in Scottsdale was an effort to prevent development 
in identified floodways, the 1985 CCRFCD Master Plan allowed building in flood plains 
after detention basins and channels were installed. In the 1960s and 1970s builders could 
easily avoid areas of the valley prone to flooding because there was plenty of “safe” land 
to build on. But the housing boom of the late 1980s and 1990s, combined with the ever 
expanding resort corridor along the Strip, consumed many of the large parcels of 
undeveloped land in the urban core. Over time, urban and suburban growth forced home 
builders and developers to begin looking at land traditionally in flood zones. Prior to the 
regionalization of flood control in 1986, the first builders in flood-prone areas were 
required to construct not only adequate mitigation structures to protect their parcels, but 
also to build out a large section of structures for the future homes and businesses.  For 
example, developers stayed away from thousands of acres southwest of Las Vegas 
because the cost of improvements would have driven their home prices above market 
rates. By the mid-1990s many large home builders such as Lewis Homes, Pardee Homes 
and American West Homes began to appreciate the dynamic improvements across the 
valley that the CCRFCD was responsible for. 
During this period, Bruce Woodbury and the Regional Transportation 
Commission (RTC) also began their ambitious beltway project. Woodbury and other 
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officials knew that when completed, the beltway would circle the valley, open up 
thousands of acres for development, and hopefully relieve the existing freeway system. 
By the mid-1990s flood control and RTC projects were built in conjunction with each 
other to save on costs and prevent major road closures. This practice saved money and 
increasingly protected developers’ investments. Indeed, Robert Lewis, the former owner 
of Lewis Homes, recalled in 2010 that once the district laid plans for protecting flood-
prone lands his company as well as other builders began to ask where the next flood 
control project would be installed or the next RTC road paved.157  
Residential and commercial builders surveyed the local housing market and 
observed patterns in the expansion of the valley’s infrastructure that prepared it for rapid 
growth. First, the building of Green Valley in the mid-1980s and then Anthem and Seven 
Hills in Henderson in the late 1990s, as well as the southern part of the Strip to Southern 
Highlands and Rhodes Ranch in the early 2000s, and then Mountain’s Edge, South 
Summerlin, Centennial and Aliante in North Las Vegas all put pressure on the flood 
control district. This land and housing boom continued until the housing bubble burst in 
late 2006. During these go-go-years, builders forged a close relationship with the 
CCRFCD to gain valuable information on future flood control projects planned upstream, 
in hopes that their land acquisition teams could purchase all available private lands 
around those future projects at the lowest possible cost.158 
 Of course, flood control in Clark County has always been about protecting the 
lives of current residents while planning for future ones. The metro area has grown in a 
radial pattern because of the high infrastructure expense incurred from drilling through 
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the desert’s hard caliche soil, which virtually prohibits the development of large home 
tracts miles beyond the existing network. The cost to bring sewer, water, power, gas to a 
new area of the valley determines where communities are built. Frazier noted in 2009 that 
“if the district’s job was to facilitate development, all we would have been doing for the 
past twenty years was building projects for developers.”159 Those who voted in 1986 for 
the funding mechanism and supported the district’s building program had experienced 
decades of stormwater damage. Still to this day, many of the original flood control 
proponents stress that the people who moved to the valley and contributed to its hyper 
growth in the 1990s and early 2000s, owed much to those residents who came together in 
1986 to address the flood threat. 
 The district they created, while it does not facilitate growth, has helped to 
safeguard “future” residents. Once a developer disturbs the native desert with buildings 
and roads, the CCRFCD ensures that the new development does not tax the surrounding 
flood control system. The district requires builders, at their cost, to construct approved 
facilities that meet the Master Plan and connect the new facilities to the existing channels. 
Once the improvements have been properly installed to meet the design criteria, they are 
integrated into the regional system and maintained with flood control funds. In some 
cases, if the district identifies a project that can protect a greater number of lives and 
property, it will fund the construction. For example, the district paid for the Angel Park 
channel to the Gowan Basin, located northwest of Las Vegas, even though it was part of 
the Summerlin Master Plan. Officials felt that communities downstream needed to be 
protected sooner than the timelines set for the private development in the area.  
                                                 
159 Gale Frazier, general manager of CCRFCD, interviewed by author, Las Vegas, NV., February 13, 2009. 
134 
 
Another reason the CCRFCD avoids building in anticipation of future growth is 
because it is hard to acquire right-of-way grants for federal lands -- 87 percent of the land 
in Nevada is owned by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Also, the district is 
precluded from building mitigation structures in national recreation areas, such as the 
Lake Mead National Recreation Area or in an instant wilderness study area, which 
contain undeveloped federal land retained in its primeval character. Currently within 
Clark County, 47,200 acres are designated as wilderness study areas.160 When land 
requires flood control facilities on federally managed area, Congress is petitioned to grant 
rights-of-way, agree to boundary changes or enter into land exchange agreements. All 
three are timely, and more importantly, very costly endeavors to undertake to protect land 
not yet developed. The Master Plan allows the district to quickly approve the desired 
structures the developer must install after the land has been purchased. By having a long 
range plan in place, land can be graded, roads paved, and homes built, and homebuyers 
and local business owners can be assured they will be protected from floods.161  
The Water is Nearly Controlled 
  Through the mid-1990s the expanding flood control system captured increased 
amounts of stormwater rushing through the valley. During the summers of 1995, 1996, 
and1997 flood waters spared the metropolitan area from massive property damage and 
loss of life, in part because of the facilities in the ground. Surprisingly, district officials 
hoped the Charleston Underpass would continue to fill with stormwater. In their view, the 
underpass was the poster-child for continued support of the Master Plan. But amazingly, 
even as the underpass continued to flood and even though less than 20-percent of the 
                                                 
160 http://www.blm.gov/nv/st/en/prog/blm_special_areas/wsas0.html 
161 Gale Frazier, general manager of CCRFCD, interviewed by author, Las Vegas, NV., February 13, 2009. 
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regional system was completed, during the 1997 legislature assembly speaker Richard 
Perkins questioned whether the flood control district should still be guaranteed the one-
quarter of one percent sales tax. Frazier, fearing the default on the bond payments if the 
legislature pulled sales tax funding, called upon Jim McGaughey, who had left the 
assembly in 1993, to assist in the matter. That spring, McGaughey contacted Bob Price, 
chair of the Nevada Taxation Committee, and other influential state officials to ensure 
that Perkins’ proposal failed. Fortunately for Clark County residents, Perkins’ attempt to 
end the district’s funding was merely a tax-cutting ploy to curry favor with his voting 
constituents. One can only wonder if Perkins ever considered the legal obligation to the 
pay off the bonds. Nevertheless, the bonding obligations saved the sales tax revenue and 
possibly the regional system. Without the bond payments, Perkins or any other over 
zealous state politician could have used the “sunset” clause in AB115 to threaten the 
district’s longevity.162 
   Clearly, the district’s expensive work was not over. In April 1999, the CCRFCD 
Board of Directors took action to earmark $28 million for the construction of the Freeway 
Channel and Bypass Facilities from Alta Drive to Sahara Avenue. The district wanted to 
build channels in conjunction with the RTC’s ambitious I-15 and U.S.95 interchange 
expansion, at the Spaghetti Bowl. These construction projects west of downtown would 
stop the Charleston Underpass from flooding. Unfortunately, the projects were not 
finished in time to prevent a massive 1999 flood from devastating homes and property in 
the central part of the valley. In parts of the Las Vegas Wash, Duck Creek Wash, and the 
Flamingo Wash, the flood waters exceeded the100-year flood standard. The thunderstorm 
                                                 
162 Las Vegas Review Journal, June 25, 1997. Jim McGaughey, former Nevada State Assemblyman (R), 
interviewed by author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, NV., April 15, 2010. 
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hit fast and required over 200 swift water rescues in and around the metro area. Damage 
to public and private property exceeded $40 million, and two people drowned. The 
county declared a state of emergency, which eventually led to a Presidential Disaster 
Declaration. Shortly after the flood waters dried up, Tim Sutko, the district’s senior 
hydrologist, told the Review Journal that the storm rivaled the 1984 floods. The Oakey 
Detention basin, built in 1992 to protect the expanding western section of the valley, 
captured 32 million gallons of stormwater before it could strike a nursing home and the 
Opportunity Village center. It can be assumed that without the flood control projects built 
through the 1990s, the 1999 flood could have been the deadliest ever to strike the 
valley.163 
 
 
                                                 
163 “The Las Vegas Flash Floods of 8 July 1999: A Post-Event Summary,” Western Regional Technical 
Attachment, No. 99-26, November 9, 1999, 2-4. Las Vegas Review Journal, July 11, 1999. 
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Figure 31. Intersection of Flamingo Road and the Strip, July 8, 1999. 
(Photo found on the web) 
 
 
Figure 32. Charleston Boulevard Underpass, July 8, 1999. 
(photo credit given to Ethan Miller of the Las Vegas Sun) 
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Ironically, this flood marked one of the last times the iconic Charleston Underpass 
flooded. The clean-up, combined with construction along I-15 and U.S.95, helped 
accelerate completion of the protective channels around downtown and the underpass. In 
a 2009 interview, Gale Frazier reflected on the “media circus” the flooded underpass 
caused throughout the decades: “It reminded people of the danger of flooding.” Without 
the visible reminder of the Charleston Underpass, the district relied on its public service 
campaigns to educate the community about flooding hazards. In 2000, the county 
commission, with the support of all other entities in the valley, designated July as “Flash 
Flood Awareness Month.” Dating back to the late 1980s, the district promoted flood 
awareness with an annual news conference every July 31st (which remains the official 
start of Las Vegas’ flood season), along with various advertising campaigns and later 
with the district’s public service television program called “The Flood Channel.” Since 
2004, the district has asked residents to submit license plate abbreviations, and in 2007 a 
Spanish language abbreviation was added to the contest. Every spring the two winning 
selections are used on billboards (fig 33) and in print ads across Clark County.164  
 
 
 
                                                 
164 Gale Frazier, general manager of CCRFCD, interview by author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, NV., 
February 13, 2009. Betty Hollister, public relations director for CCRFCD, email to author, February 22, 
2011. 
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Figure 33. 2010 CCRFCD billboard winners, English and Spanish 
(Image courtesy of CCRFCD) 
 
 
 The last major flood to damage the Las Vegas valley occurred on August 19, 
2003 in the northwest. The intense thunderstorm dropped two inches of rain over 49 
square miles in less than 90-minutes. Gowan Road near U.S.95 became an instant river, 
and flood control officials estimated the flow rate down Gowan reached 3,000 cubic feet 
per second (a private residential pool holds approximately 3,000 cubic feet of water). No 
deaths occurred, but local emergency crews conducted numerous swift-water and 
helicopter rescues. Flood waters soaked 60 homes and caused $2 million in private and 
public property damage. However, the devastation would have been much worse if not 
for the fact that local flood control facilities were completed and in place at the time. The 
system captured 400-acre feet of runoff, which is comparable to a football field with 400-
feet of water on top of it (an acre-foot is 325,851 gallons water). Without those facilities, 
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the flow rates down Gowan would have exceeded 10,000 cubic feet per second, which 
would have threatened human lives and destroyed hundreds of homes.165 
 
Figure 34. City of Las Vegas Fire Engine trapped, August 19, 2003. 
(Image found on the internet) 
 
The 2003 flood hit an area that had additional flood control measures’ approved 
and ready for construction, but the event occurred before the projects start dates. Unlike 
prior decades of reactive flood control measures, the district stuck to the Master Plan’s 
construction priorities and installed the facilities that would have protected the area 
around Gowan in accordance with the original schedule. Then came the storms of August 
2 and 27, 2007, both of which mirrored the intensity and rainfall measurements of the 
2003 storm. But little damage was reported from these storms. Officials noted that heavy 
                                                 
165 “Rainfall Event Report: August 19, 2003.” Prepared by CCRFCD, November 4, 2003. “Apples and 
Oranges,” CCRFCD public information video, 
http://acequia.ccrfcd.org/VideoViewer/VideoViewer.aspx?ReturnName=Public+Information+Videos&Ret
urnURL=http%3a%2f%2facequia.ccrfcd.org%2fPIVideos%2fPIVideos.aspx&VideoURL=http%3a%2f%2
facequia.ccrfcd.org%2fpdf_arch1%2fpublic+information%2fvideos%2fApplesAndOranges.flv. 
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rains fell over areas in the west of the valley where the entire flood control infrastructure 
was built and in the ground. The network of detention basins and channels in place 
worked as designed, capturing massive amounts of stormwater and diverting it around 
neighborhoods. Between the two storms nearly 700 acre feet of water rushed into the 
detention basins, which slowed the water’s velocity before safely conveying it to Lake 
Mead.166 
More recently during the week of December 17-23, 2010, a sustained low 
pressure system remained stationary off the coast of southern California, producing 
significant rainfall for much of Clark County and southern Utah. This type of low 
pressure system is commonly referred to as the “pineapple express,” because it pumps 
moist tropical air from the Pacific Ocean into the continental U.S. During the six days of 
constant rainfall, gauges across Southern Nevada reported one to two inches of 
accumulation. But in the valley only a few road closures occurred, mostly in the remote 
Blue Diamond community and Red Rock National Recreation Area. The flood control 
infrastructure functioned as designed, collecting 1335 acre feet of stormwater 
(approximately 435 million gallons of water) and conveying it through the system. But 
communities beyond the metro area were not so lucky. Indeed, floods ravaged 
Bunkerville, Moapa, and Mesquite. And, St George, Utah experienced significant flood 
damage when the Virgin River nearly breached its banks. The river also threatened an 
earthen dam in Beaver Dam, Arizona, destroying two homes in the small community.167 
 
                                                 
166 Ibid. 
167 Las Vegas Review Journal, December 28, 2010. “Rainfall Event Report: December 17-23, 2010,” 
prepared by CCRFCD, January 24, 2011. Betty Hollister, public relations director for CCRFCD, email to 
author, February 23, 2011. 
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Figure 35. A home washing into the Virgin River in the Beaver Dam, Arizona. 
(photo credit given to Associated Press) 
 
 
By January 2011, the regional flood control system had 83 basins and 550 miles 
of channel, 130 of which were natural washes that will remain natural pathways. 
Currently, Clark County continues to feel the effects of the 2008 recession. With sales tax 
revenues continuing their decline since 2007, the district projected revenues for fiscal 
year 2010-2011 stood at $65.6 million, which is 15 percent less than the prior year. From 
2007 to 2010, sales tax revenues shrunk by 72 percent. Consequently, construction costs 
dropped 70 percent during the same period because contractors, struggling to win bids, 
significantly lowered their rates. In addition, the current economic climate has caused 
greater competition among construction contractors. For example, prior to the 2007 
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downturn, four or five construction companies submitted project bids, but by 2010 the 
district consistently received bids from fifteen or more companies.168 
Surprisingly, as the recession battered the local construction industry, the 2009 
economic stimulus packaged of President Barak Obama and Senate Majority Leader 
Harry Reid did not include earmarks for flood control construction in Clark County. Even 
though the regional system in Clark County is a model for public works in the struggling 
Southwest and a source of valuable construction jobs, the stimulus bill’s criteria required 
that money could only go toward current Army Corps of Engineers projects. The $239 
million in federal funds used to complete the Corps’ $336 million Tropicana and 
Flamingo Wash projects did not qualify because all the detention basins and channels had 
been completed prior to the stimulus bill’s passage. However, the bill did allow the 
district to sell $150 million Build America Bonds (BABS), which Clark County sold in 
June 2009. The BABS gave the district a 35-percent payback on the interest paid. So, 
while the annual interest payment is $9.4 million, which the federal government will 
reimburse the district $3.3 million annually for it.169  
                                                 
168 Gale Frazier, general manager of CCRFCD, email to author, February 14, 2011. 
169 Gale Frazier, general manager of CCRFCD, email to author, December 20, 2010. 
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Figure 36. The Northeast C-1 channel and basin. 
(image courtesy of CCRFCD) 
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Figure 37. Las Vegas Valley completed Master Plan as of January 2011. 
Areas in blue are completed; areas in orange are planned for the next ten years.  
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The Future is Yet Sustainable 
 It can be argued as the storms of August 2007 and December 2010 demonstrate 
that the flood control system is accomplishing the Master Plan’s goals of safeguarding 
the valley from rampaging waters. As the local economy continues to struggle and regain 
its momentum during the Great Recession, the Master Plan is in place to ensure that 
future growth will be protected.170 However, the legislation governing the district does 
not allow funding for projects in anticipation of future growth, preventing valuable 
taxpayer money from being wasted on facilities that do not help existing residents. Once 
the valley is protected, the district has procedures in place to inspect and possibly 
reconstruct facilities built in the early phases of the Master Plan, as well as fund 
maintenance projects within the system. As the physical threat of stormwater decreases 
with every new flood control project installed, the struggle over sustainable water 
resources intensifies.    
 The Las Vegas metropolitan water area’s resource is unique. Many of America’s 
riverfront cities treat waste water and then dump it into the river. Downstream, another 
community pulls it out, treats it for human consumption, then the wastewater is treated 
and dumped back into the river, and so on and so forth. In the Las Vegas valley it is a 
closed cycle – the wastewater is treated and released into the Las Vegas Wash and then 
into Lake Mead, where the community’s drinking water is taken from. A decade-long 
drought in Southern Nevada and the increased demand for water in the region has 
                                                 
170 In December 2010 there were 307 new home building permits issued, Las Vegas Review Journal, 
January 17, 2011, compared to 2,733 in October 2007, statistic from Home Builder’s Research.  
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lowered Lake Mead nearly 100 feet. It is no surprise that reliable clean water is a major 
concern for Southern Nevada’s future.171 
In addition to stormwater conveyances, stormwater quality has become a major 
environmental issue in the past two decades. Since the 1990s, environmental groups and 
clean water advocates have expressed their concern over the untreated stormwater 
flowing into the Las Vegas Wash and into Lake Mead.172 Unlike wastewater, stormwater 
is not treated before it enters Lake Mead. Flood control officials point to the fact that 90 
percent of all the water in the Las Vegas Wash is treated water, while stormwater only 
represents 5-percent of the outflow, which historically comes during rain storms lasting 
over three to five days. The lake’s pollutant levels spike during these intense rain storms, 
but dissipate quickly. District officials point to the ability of coastal communities to trace 
sustained pollutant levels back to stormwater because the event frequency is much 
higher. Clean water advocates, working in conjunction with the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), require these communities to treat stormwater.  
For the past decade, the EPA has required all American land developers to submit 
a Storm Water Management Plan (SWAMP) for approval. SWAMPs outline the 
developer’s physical barriers to prevent erosion and soil runoff, in addition to the general 
contractor’s own policies and procedures designed to minimize pollutants from exiting 
the construction site. In Clark County, the curb and gutter system connects to the flood 
                                                 
171 Kevin Eubanks, assistant general manager CCRFCD, interviewed by author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, 
NV., March 5 and March 30, 2010. 
172 In 1989 the CCRFCD got involved to assist in protecting the region’s water resources. EPA instructed 
local communities and other regulatory agencies to do something about stormwater. Boulder City and 
Mesquite were exempt because their populations were small enough. In 1990 the Clark County received the 
its first Municipal Separate Storm Sewer System (MSSSS) permit. At that time none of the entities had 
funding, so the state looked to the CCRFCD for money. Under NRS543, the district could use funds from 
the sales tax increase to protect the environment. Kevin Eubanks, assistant general manager CCRFCD, 
interviewed by author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, NV., March 30, 2010. 
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control system. In 2004 the CCRFCD adopted a program to inspect construction sites for 
soil runoff and levy steep fines on any developer who did not comply. Currently, the EPA 
does not require the CCRFCD to treat the valley’s stormwater prior to its entering Lake 
Mead. However, in 2009, the agency itself began “setting the bar higher” on pollutant 
levels entering domestic waterways. The district partnered with the Southern Nevada 
Water Authority (SNWA) to achieve the EPA’s expectations of stormwater quality. 
Presently, the district’s major concern is that the EPA is attempting to set blanket national 
standards. In the Las Vegas valley, the first few minutes of a rain storm washes off large 
amounts of street pollutants into the flood control system. So, the CCRFCD, in 
conjunction with SNWA, is educating the public to assist in preventing pollutants from 
entering the system and contaminating Lake Mead.173 
 As partnerships between the CCRFCD, SNWA and the EPA evolve, their 
combined focus will be to ensure that Southern Nevada’s water resources are protected 
from man-made pollutants. The current drought affecting Lake Mead water levels, along 
with increased water demands for the metropolitan area, the district’s role in the region’s 
land-use, stormwater quality and flood plain management will inevitably become more 
important in protecting region’s clean water supply.  
At the federal level, CCRFCD management practices continue to provide FEMA 
with valuable mapping and modeling techniques to help other communities manage their 
flood zones. With a proven funding mechanism in place since 1986, FEMA officials 
point to the district as a model for other communities considering comprehensive regional 
                                                 
173 Ibid. Norma Cox, former chair of Water Resources for League of Women Voters and Las Vegas Wash 
Development Committee, interviewed by author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, NV., June 1, 2010. Peter 
Jackson, City of Las Vegas Flood Control Senior Assistant Engineer, interviewed by author, tape recorded, 
Las Vegas, NV., March 25, 2009. 
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flood control to evaluate. The higher local regulatory standards adopted in the 1980s for 
new construction allow FEMA to focus on higher risk areas primarily along the nation’s 
coastal and river systems. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, it became imperative that 
communities in flood-prone regions take proactive measures to mitigate flood hazards. 
FEMA is currently in the process of recertifying all major levees across America.  
Even with language written into NRS 543 that could dissolve the district after the 
balance of flood control projects are completed and despite the fact that the 2008-2010 
recession slowed residential and commercial development in the region, periodic storms 
will continue to pound Clark County. Over the next fifty years as the Master Plan’s build 
out is completed, many of the early channels will require reinforcement or reconstruction. 
During the foreseeable future the revenues from the one-quarter of one-percent sales tax 
and the money generated from bond sales will be needed to fund maintenance and 
upgrades to detention basins, channels and other flood control facilities. The metropolis’ 
future growth patterns will be integrated into the existing regional system because of the 
long-range planning embedded in the district’s Master Plan and because of the uniform 
building standards and regulations developed over the past quarter-century. 
Conclusion 
  Like other burgeoning desert cities, Las Vegas and its suburbs postponed a 
systematic approach to street flooding for as long as possible. Even after the municipality 
and Strip began to expand across numerous washes that once lay beyond the built-up 
areas, voters were slow to fund the occasional bond issues that usually followed 
destructive floods. Las Vegans were more concerned with building streets, schools, and 
other high-priority projects. For most of the twentieth century residents were content to 
150 
 
combat flooding with such band-aid solutions as installing a culvert or spanning a wash 
with a small road bridge. Even after the great flood of 1955 that caused millions of 
dollars in damage, residents of Clark County voted down a 1962 bond issue to fund an 
Army Corps of Engineer-designed flood control project. Even in 1975 when devastating 
floodwaters at Caesars Palace imperiled Las Vegas’ tourist image, the response remained 
meager.  
Indeed, there was no real effort to fund a valley-wide comprehensive solution to 
flooding until 1985 when Clark County Commissioner Bruce Woodbury and State 
Assemblyman Jim McGaughey assembled a small group of progressive-minded 
politicians, engineers, and dedicated private citizens to promote the benefits of 
developing a regional solution to flooding. Inspiring the group was a series of disastrous 
floods during the early 1980s, which endangered residents, virtually shutdown the Strip, 
ravaged old and new communities throughout the area, caused millions of dollars in 
damages to public and private property, and resulted in loss of life. In particular, the 
drowning of a two-week old baby girl, along with her entire family in September 1984 
helped solidify Jim McGaughey’s dedication to push Nevada’s legislature to approve an 
independent flood control district for Clark County. Bruce Woodbury led a year-long 
political campaign to gain voter approval for the flood control district’s funding 
mechanism. Even though flood-related deaths and massive property damage continued to 
occur over the next two-decades, 1985 became the watershed for community action. Las 
Vegas finally took responsibility for protecting life and property in their metropolitan 
area.  
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By the mid-1980s, Strip executives, politicians, civic groups and community 
leaders recognized that something had to be done. In 1986, with more than 500,000 
residents, the valley finally had enough tax base to fund the flood control district with an 
increase in the county’s sales tax. With growing support for a regional flood control 
solution, in September of 1986 county residents overwhelming approved a dedicated 
funding mechanism to build a multi-billion dollar system of basins and channels that 
many officials estimated could take over a half-century to complete. The creation of the 
Clark County Regional Flood Control District not only produced a blueprint for change, 
but also symbolized the growing willingness of the four cities and Clark County to work 
together for the common good. A handful of visionary local and state politicians molded 
the flood control district into an independent government agency, making it the first 
special use district in Clark County not controlled by a specific jurisdiction. 
Representatives from all the local entities came together, without the fear of relinquishing 
their political control to a rival, and finally began making progress on a comprehensive 
mitigation system. The new legislation appointed a group of committed private citizens to 
monitor and oversee the funding of projects, while a separate committee of technical 
advisors, comprised of public works department officials, prioritized projects to ensure 
that the regional system was not high-jacked or manipulated for political gain. After 
decades of feuding over tax revenues, sewer districts, fire and police services, and 
regional planning, the politically fragmented metropolis had matured enough that 
officials and residents finally came together in a cooperative spirit to solve a problem that 
threatened them all.  
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The Las Vegas valley’s unique geography and the unpredictable nature of flash 
floods in the arid southwest will always require proactive stormwater mitigation to 
protect lives and property. Even during economic downturns, fluctuating environmental 
policies and threats to the longevity of its dedicated sales tax revenues, the district 
continues to provide funding for construction of new facilities and the maintenance of the 
existing system, as it invests to safeguard the community. It is vitally important that 
future residents recognize the potential for larger and even deadlier storms to strike the 
valley. As more channels are installed and basins built, the hazards of a 100-year event 
will continue to decrease, but flood control officials speculate that the region’s weather 
patterns could still produce 200-year and even 500-year floods, potentially over-flowing 
the metropolitan system. Still, the Clark County Flood Control District has accomplished 
a lot in its first quarter century of life. It has forever transformed the physical layout of 
the Las Vegas metropolitan area by correcting decades of mistakes embodied in the old 
patchwork approach to flooding. In the process it has greatly improved the quality of life 
for all Las Vegas area residents while also providing a safe blueprint for future growth. 
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Break down of projects for the first eight years of the CCRFCD Master Plan 
Las Vegas Review Journal, February 14, 1987. 
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